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Abstract
As immigration reform initiatives driven by established advocacy organizations in
Washington, D.C. were successively defeated in the mid-to-late 2000s, movementcentered organizations and newly created formations of undocumented youth mobilized
against the federal-local immigration enforcement regime of the Bush and Obama
administrations. This mobilization included a mix of community organizing, litigation,
policy and media advocacy, and direct action tactics. Lawyers supported movementcentered social change campaigns as counsel to existing organizations and to the
undocumented youth groups that grew, evolved, and multiplied during this period.
Drawing on media, scholarly, and first person accounts, this Article describes the
campaigns that constituted the anti-enforcement mobilization between 2009 and 2012,
with particular focus on the range of roles played by lawyers and the implications of that
repertoire in theorizing about resistance to legality and the place of law and lawyering in
social movement activism.
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INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, social movement organizations and newly created formations of undocumented youth mobilized against the immigration enforcement
regimes of the Bush and Obama administrations. This mobilization included a
mix of community organizing, litigation, policy and media advocacy, and direct
action tactics. Lawyers supported movement-centered social change campaigns
as counsel to existing organizations and to the undocumented youth groups that
grew, evolved, and multiplied during this period.1
The first phase—between 2009 and 2012—is the subject of this Article.2
As immigrant activism was ascendant due to the political maturation and
engagement of a generation of mostly undocumented youth, lawyers worked
with social movement organizations and newly created activist groups to advance
a series of organizing initiatives against the detention and deportation regime.
They confronted entrenched white supremacist forces in Arizona terrorizing
immigrant communities through racial profiling and criminalization.3 They
simultaneously faced incumbent policy advocates in Washington, D.C. waiting
for a grand deal that would both expand immigration enforcement and offer an
extended and highly contingent route to citizenship for undocumented residents.4 In this environment of instability and inefficacy, movement actors and
lawyers waged surprisingly successful campaigns to discourage local authorities
from enforcing federal immigration law and to defend immigrants from interior
enforcement through categorical grants of relief from deportation. This Article
looks closely at how those campaigns unfolded, with particular focus on the role
of lawyers engaged in collaborations with movement leaders, activists, and constituents.
This work extends and complicates at least two sets of legal academic literatures. First, within socio-legal studies, a group of scholars—most prominently,
1.
2.

3.
4.

This Article refers to movement formations as composed of undocumented activists, though
individuals with a variety of legal statuses were core members.
The latter two phases extend from 2012 to 2014 when newly emboldened immigrant activists
engaged in extra-legal activities, including civil disobedience, that illuminated foundational
alterations in immigrant defense lawyering and governing ethical frameworks. Between 2014 and
2016, the immigrant rights movement confronted a nation-wide federal court injunction. I will
discuss these latter phases in subsequent work. Another delineation: this Article focuses largely on
the Southern California node of a nation-wide, complex, and multi-polar social movement of
immigrant activists. It is not intended to be a complete history of all of the social movement
organizations active in the field in this period.
See discussion infra Section I.B.
See discussion infra Sections I.A, I.B.
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Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey5 and Austin Sarat6—have engaged in qualitative
research on how individuals resist legal regimes in everyday life. Their findings
expand how we conceive of law and legality: as formal and informal, constraining
and liberating, immersive and iterative. However, as it redefines law and resistance,
this literature pays less attention to the roles of lawyers, perhaps due to the
overarching effort to expand the field of study beyond courtrooms and legislative
chambers where lawyers predominate. The narrative of social movement mobilization documented in this Article portrays resistance activities largely outside of
those formal venues of law. However, lawyers remain a part of the story, as facilitators, enablers, and defenders, especially as governing regimes adapt and deploy
legality to abate burgeoning resistance. If we work to uncover a process of
resistance rather than individual acts in isolation, we can begin to disaggregate
the essential roles of participants in that process. This Article describes a process
of resistance in the context of immigrant rights advocacy and discerns a distinctive role for lawyers, particularly in efforts led by laypeople to reconstruct legality.
Second, this Article extends and renews the critical legal academic literature
on public interest lawyering, exemplified by the work of Gerald López,7 Lucie
White,8 Tony Alfieri,9 and others. Following a wave of critical studies within the
legal academy, these authors captured disillusion with public interest law in the
aftermath of the civil rights era and in the midst of Reagan-era assaults on poor
people and the social safety net. They looked to the bottom within the United
States or to the Global South to unearth stories of collaborations between
lawyers and clients. Consistent with the client-centered advocacy ideology
being advanced in clinical legal education at the time,10 these scholars were particularly attentive to the problem of lawyer domination in relationships with poor
clients. The result was a body of work that charged generations of law graduates
with the responsibility to respect and defer to laypeople, to advance the agency of
5.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

See generally Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, Conformity, Contestation, and Resistance: An Account
of Legal Consciousness, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 731 (1992) [hereinafter Ewick & Silbey,
Conformity]; Patricia Ewick & Susan Silbey, Narrating Social Structure: Stories of Resistance to Legal
Authority, 108 AM. J. SOC. 1328 (2003) [hereinafter Ewick & Silbey, Narrating].
See generally Austin Sarat, “. . . The Law Is All Over”: Power, Resistance, and the Legal Consciousness of
the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343 (1990).
See, e.g., Gerald LÓPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO’S VISION OF
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992).
See, e.g., Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the
Hearing of Mrs. G, 38 BUFF L. REV. 1 (1990).
See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic Empowerment,
16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 659 (1987–88) [hereinafter Alfieri, Antinomies of Poverty];
Anthony V. Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, 81 GEO. L.J. 2567 (1993).
See, e.g., DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A
CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977).
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clients, and to put aside the grander visions of lawyer-centered social change
harbored by preceding generations. Like the recent historical work on the long
civil rights movement,11 this Article brings to the surface recessive threads of ambitious public interest lawyers and activated collectives dynamically collaborating
with a higher level of engagement, solidarity, and efficacy than contemplated in
earlier scholarly work.
This Article also contributes to a much-needed collection of works focused on
contemporaneous movement lawyering, including focus on the roles of lawyers
supporting Black Lives Matter-affiliated groups around the country, as well as
environmental justice, Indigenous Peoples’, Title IX, and transgender activism.
In this particular moment in American political culture, the propagation of
accounts of activists and lawyers engaged in creative social justice campaigns is a
worthy end in and of itself.
Part I of this Article sets out the mobilization narrative of immigrant rights
activists fighting for movement control, who were supported by lawyers located
outside of the most prominent public interest litigation shops in the field. The
arc of the story moves from renewed hope for a path to citizenship at the dawn of
the Obama era to disappointment, recalibration, and renewal. Part II situates the
mobilization narrative within socio-legal studies on resistance to legality and sets
forth a process of resistance with an essential role for allied lawyers. As described
below, movement actors resist legality and attempt to reconstruct it, particularly
when their very existence as participants in the polity is at stake. Lawyers support
that existential turn to reconstruction. Part III sets out the core features of
movement lawyering as documented in this immigrant rights narrative, including
the development of critical movement infrastructure—both ideational and organizational, co-generation of resources for organizing, and accompaniment and
openness to transformation. This Article concludes with a brief reflection on the
meaning of this mobilization narrative in the Trump era.
I.

MOBILIZATION

The campaigns waged by immigrant advocates between 2009 and 2012
culminated in the announcement by President Obama of relief from deportation

11.

See, e.g., TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG
HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2011); SUSAN D. CARLE, DEFINING THE
STRUGGLE: NATIONAL RACIAL JUSTICE ORGANIZING, 1880–1915 (2013); KENNETH W.
MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE CREATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER (2012).
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for undocumented youth with strong ties to the United States.12 The Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals program (DACA) was a significant and surprising
victory for a determined network of undocumented youth activists and their
allies. This Part discusses the mobilization that led to this victory in four stages:
first, the initial hope for comprehensive immigration reform (CIR)13 offered by
the election of President Obama and Democratic majorities in both houses of
Congress; second, the failure of legislative reform and the rise of an advocacy
network opposed to some of the tactics and goals of the incumbent political actors;
third, the continued expansion of immigration enforcement in the interior of the
United States and the need for creative advocacy responses; and fourth, the policy
struggle that led to the establishment of DACA.
A.

Legislative Opportunity

Immigration advocacy organizations agitated to create a path to naturalization for the undocumented in the 2000s against a backdrop of policy and cultural
shifts precipitated by 9/11. Immigration enforcement—first at the Department
of Justice and later at the Department of Homeland Security—became a central
site within the federal government for the Bush Administration’s “war on terror.”14
Government actors deployed their enhanced enforcement capacity against Latinx
communities,15 while immigration restrictionists outside of government crafted
“a powerful apocalyptic narrative, relying on emotionally evocative metaphors

12.
13.

14.

15.

Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, The White House, Remarks by the President on
Immigration (June 15, 2012, 2:59 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/
06/15/remarks-president-immigration [https://perma.cc/Y9AU-GJEN].
Comprehensive immigration reform proposals have varied in content but have generally included
increased border security, immigration verification requirements for employers, and a pathway
to citizenship or conditional immigration relief for undocumented immigrants already living in the
United States. A recent example is S. 744, 113th Cong. (2013).
David A. Harris, The War on Terror, Local Police, and Immigration Enforcement: A Curious Tale of
Police Power in Post-9/11 America, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 5, 17–19 (2006) (outlining the advantages
offered by immigration law in enforcement efforts against individuals alleged to be involved in
terrorist activity).
See Nicholas De Genova, The Production of Culprits: From Deportability to Detainability in the
Aftermath of “Homeland Security”, 11 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 421, 427–28 (2007). I refer to members
of immigrant communities with origins in Mexico, Central and South America, and parts of the
Caribbean basin as “Latinx” in this Article. See Raquel Reichard, Why We Say Latinx: Trans &
Gender Non-Conforming People Explain, LATINA (Aug. 29, 2015), http://www.latina.com/lifestyle
/our-issues/why-we-say-latinx-trans-gender-non-conforming-people-explain [https://perma.cc/
P8A9-AKNP].
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and synecdoches to shift the debate in an anti-immigrant direction by making
immigrants synonymous with criminals, and then terrorists.”16
Between 2001 and 2008, established advocacy organizations worked to
construct the counter-narrative of the “DREAMers,” talented young undocumented students deprived of equal opportunity due to their lack of legal status.17
Senator Orrin Hatch and Representative Luis Gutierrez had introduced the first
iteration of the DREAM (Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors)
Act just before 9/11 on August 1, 2001.18 The legislation would have allowed
those undocumented residents of “good moral character” who had come to the
United States at a young age and had since completed high school to adjust their
status and avoid deportation.19 Later versions of the bill also promised a path to
naturalization to U.S. military enlistees.20 According to sociologist Walter
Nicholls, established advocacy organizations devised the DREAMer campaign
in Congress and controlled its messaging in the public sphere.21 Nicholls goes on
to describe the strict framing imposed on participants in the political organizing:
[T]he leadership centralized message production, structured messages
through the use of talking points, and silenced utterances and symbols
that detracted from the core argument. Just as important, they disci-

16.

17.

18.
19.

20.
21.

Julie Stewart, Fiction Over Facts: How Competing Narrative Forms Explain Policy in a New
Immigration Destination, 27 SOC. F. 591, 609 (2012); see, e.g., Mark Krikorian, Keeping Terror Out,
NAT’L INT., Spring 2004, at 77, 78. “Restrictionists” seek to limit immigration, while
“restrictionism” refers to a policy or philosophy favoring the restriction of immigration. See Daniel
Kanstroom, Crying Wolf or a Dying Canary?, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 435, 455–56
(1999) (book review) (discussing definitions of restrictionism).
WALTER J. NICHOLLS, THE DREAMERS: HOW THE UNDOCUMENTED YOUTH
MOVEMENT TRANSFORMED THE IMMIGRANT RIGHTS DEBATE 13–14 (2013). The
National Immigration Law Center (NILC) and the Center for Community Change were the
primary drafters of the DREAM Act and advocated for it in Congress. Id. at 31. NILC later
helped found United We Dream, “a site where national rights associations worked with youths to
produce the core messages of the campaign.” Walter J. Nicholls & Tara Fiorito, Dreamers
Unbound: Immigrant Youth Mobilizing, NEW LAB. F. (Jan. 19 2015), http://newlabor
forum.cuny.edu/2015/01/19/dreamers-unbound-immigrant-youth-mobilizing/ [https://perma.cc
/W4VX-5FVF]. Nicholls characterizes these organizations, and a few others noted below, infra
note 41, as “well-established advocacy organizations” in possession of cultural and symbolic capital
that they shared with immigrant youth activists. NICHOLLS, supra, at 13. I refer to these
organizations collectively as the “established advocacy organizations” throughout this Article.
S. 1291, 107th Cong. (2001).
Id. § 3(a)(1)(e). But see Elizabeth Keyes, Defining American: The DREAM Act, Immigration Reform
and Citizenship, 14 NEV. L.J. 101, 141–54 (2013) (criticizing the DREAM Act framework for
determining worthiness); Fanny Lauby, Leaving the ‘Perfect DREAMer’ Behind? Narratives and
Mobilization in Immigration Reform, 15 SOC. MOVEMENT STUD. 374, 380–82 (2016) (noting
that the DREAMer narrative focused on the relative deservingness of a subset of the
undocumented population).
See S. 1545, 18th Cong. § 5(d)(2003).
NICHOLLS, supra note 17, at 13–14.
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plined undocumented youth activists who were responsible for carrying
the message into the public sphere. . . . Training sessions helped
socialize youth activists into the DREAMer discourse, shaped their
views of their place and rights in the country, and contributed to forming
individual undocumented youths into a common political subject with
common worldviews, aspirations, and emotional dispositions.22

The established advocacy organizations worked closely with allies in Congress
to create a class of “good” undocumented immigrants especially deserving of a
path to naturalization.
Introduction in 2005 of an “enforcement-first” bill by Representative Jim
Sensenbrenner telegraphed that many in power believed there are no “good”
immigrants among those who have entered the country illegally. The Border
Protection, Anti-Terrorism and Illegal Immigration Control Act (the
Sensenbrenner Bill) emphasized the perceived need to crack down on the undocumented population in the United States.23 The bill would have changed an initial
illegal entry from a misdemeanor24 to a felony and increased criminal liability for
anyone who assists an undocumented person in remaining in the United States,
among other punitive enforcement measures.25 The bill passed in the U.S.
House of Representatives at the end of 200526 but failed to progress in the Senate.27 Established advocacy organizations and new institutional players,
such as state federations of hometown associations, services unions, ethnic
radio, and religious organizations without prior involvement in advocacy, used
the Sensenbrenner Bill to mobilize Latinx and immigrant communities.28 In
March 2006, one hundred thousand people marched in Chicago against the bill
and in favor of CIR.29 One month later, there were similar marches in 140 cities
across the country; a second march in Chicago and in Dallas numbered in the
hundreds of thousands.30 The Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006,

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

29.
30.

Id. at 14.
See H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. (2005).
See Immigration and Nationality Act § 275(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2012).
Id. § 274, 8 U.S.C. § 1324.
H.R. 4437, 109th Cong., 151 CONG. REC. H12014 (2005).
S. 2454, 109th Cong., 152 CONG. REC. S3358 (2006).
See Louis DeSipio, Drawing New Lines in the Sand: Evaluating the Failure of Immigration Reforms
from 2006 to the Beginning of the Obama Administration, in RALLYING FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS:
THE FIGHT FOR INCLUSION IN 21ST CENTURY AMERICA 215, 216–18 (Kim Voss & Irene
Bloemraad eds., 2011).
See Oscar Avila & Antonio Olivo, A Show of Strength; Thousands March to Loop for Immigrants’
Rights, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 11, 2006, at A1.
See Laura Griffin, Huge Rally in Dallas in Support of Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/09/us/09cnd-protest.html; Rallies Across U.S. Call for Illegal
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supported by the Bush Administration,31 passed the Senate in May 200632 but was
not taken up by the House.
The Bush Administration was unable to overcome the objections to CIR of
Republican restrictionists, even as it moved aggressively to enforce immigration
law in the field. On May 12, 2008, the Administration mounted the largest
immigration raid in U.S. history at a meatpacking plant in Postville, Iowa, in
which undocumented workers were rounded up, threatened with criminal prosecution, and subjected to summary immigration proceedings in makeshift
courtrooms created specifically to process captives from the raid.33 That same
year, the Bush Administration initiated “Secure Communities: A Comprehensive
Plan to Identify and Remove Criminal Aliens” (S-Comm), which expanded
federal-local immigration enforcement coordination by automating information
sharing and imposing mandated detention policies for immigrants caught up in
local law enforcement.34 Under S-Comm, a participating local law enforcement
agency would run an individual’s biometric information through multiple
databases, including one for civil immigration violations.35 This would occur
subsequent to any kind of arrest, even on minor charges or on charges later
dropped.36 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement would then ask the
local agency to hold an individual with a civil immigration violation on record for
later transfer to federal authorities.37 In September 2008, Congress appropriated
funds to support the program.38
Candidate Obama campaigned on fixing the immigration system and so
raised the hopes of reformers.39 However, the rollout of S-Comm continued

31.
32.
33.
34.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Immigrant Rights, CNN (Apr. 10, 2006, 10:08 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/
04/10/immigration/index.html?section=cnn_us [https://perma.cc/CJ7N-6W86].
S. 2611, 109th Cong. (2006).
Id.
See Erik Camayd-Freixas, Interpreting After the Largest ICE Raid in US History: A Personal Account,
7 LATINO STUD. 123 (2009).
U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, SECURE COMMUNITIES: A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN
TO IDENTIFY AND REMOVE CRIMINAL ALIENS 1 (2009) [hereinafter SECURE COMMUNITIES
PLAN],
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/securecommunitiesstrategicplan
09.pdf [https://perma.cc/9EYS-C7PD]; see also U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T,
SECURE COMMUNITIES PROGRAM PRESENTATIONS (2009–10) [hereinafter SECURE
COMMUNITIES PRESENTATIONS], https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/secure
communitiespresentations.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7AT-PZ7D].
SECURE COMMUNITIES PLAN, supra note 34, at 2.
Id.
See id.
See SECURE COMMUNITIES PRESENTATIONS, supra note 34, at 4.
See Molly Ball, Obama’s Long Immigration Betrayal, ATLANTIC (Sept. 9, 2014) http://www.
[https://
theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/09/obamas-long-immigration-betrayal/379839
perma.cc/M4VB-C4EJ].
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unabated in his administration. For example, in January 2009, an ICE official
initiated the program’s implementation in California in a letter to the state
Department of Justice requesting the execution of a memorandum of agreement.40
Nevertheless, advocates were hopeful that they might see legislative progress on
immigration reform under the new administration. In Washington, D.C. (and
at more than forty events in thirty-five states), a broad coalition of labor, business,
civil rights, religious, and community organizations joined together in June 2009
to announce the formation of Reform Immigration FOR America (RIFA).41
The coalition advocated a path to citizenship for the undocumented with an emphasis on preserving family unity, strengthening labor standards, and enforcing
the border.42 RIFA deployed a “national text messaging system and various on-line
organizing strategies” to begin mobilizing for the expected legislative push for
comprehensive immigration reform.43
B.

Dissident Organizing

That push never came. The poor economy and high unemployment rate,
the oppositional tack of the Republican minorities in both houses, and the focus
of the Obama Administration and congressional leadership on the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act and the Affordable Care Act put immigration
reform in suspension.44 RIFA turned out 250,000 people for a demonstration in
Washington, D.C. in March 2010 that did not move the needle in Congress.45
40.
41.

42.
43.
44.
45.

Letter from David J. Venturella, Exec. Dir., Secure Comtys., to Linda Denly, Dep’t of Justice (Jan.
23, 2009), http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/MSNBC/Sections/NEWS/z_Personal/AJohnson/
Venturella_Letter_090410.pdf [https://perma.cc/4W82-VBPE].
Press Release, Mark McCullough, Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Reform Immigration FOR America
Campaign Launched to Spearhead National Immigration Reform Effort (June 3, 2009),
http://old.seiu.org/2009/06/reform-immigration-for-america-campaign-launched-to-spearheadnational-immigration-reform-effort.php [https://perma.cc/EGQ5-YNQ6]. Reform Immigration
for America (RIFA) was funded by major foundations such as Atlantic Philanthropies and
principal members included Center for Community Change, National Council of La Raza, and
the National Immigration Forum. NICHOLLS, supra 17, at 43. NILC, Mexican American Legal
Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), National Day Laborer Organizing Network
(NDLON) were members of the coalition but had less central roles. Id. at 44. Los Angeles’s
Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights (CHIRLA) brought youth chapters from across
California into the coalition and in its advocacy for comprehensive immigration reform. Id.
Our Principles, REFORM IMMIGRATION AM., https://reformimmigrationforamerica.org/ourprinciples [https://perma.cc/VA9W-9CTJ].
Press Release, Mark McCullough, supra note 41.
See Josh Hicks, Obama’s Failed Promise of a First-Year Immigration Overhaul, WASH. POST (Sept.
25, 2012), http://wpo.st/5XJQ2 [https://perma.cc/FRQ8-8QVY].
See N.C. Aizenman, Broad Coalition Packs Mall to Urge Overhaul of Immigration Laws, WASH.
POST (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/
21/AR2010032100956.html.
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The legislative stasis, as well as the continued expansion of S-Comm by the
Administration, strained relationships and alliances within RIFA. Immigrant
youth leaders that were mobilized—and in some cases trained—by RIFA were
less patient with the politicians than established advocacy organizations with
close ties to the Administration and Congress. They began to agitate for the use
of more aggressive tactics and different strategic goals.
Four undocumented students—Felipe Matos, Gaby Pacheco, Carlos Roa,
and Juan Rodriguez—set out on foot on what they called the “Trail of
DREAMS” on January 1, 2010, from Miami to Washington, D.C.46 Five
others—Marisol Ramos, Martin Lopez, Daniela Hidalgo, Jose Luis Zacatelco,
and Gabriel Martinez—left from New York for D.C. on April 10.47 The students were supported by state-based immigrant advocacy organizations in Florida
and New York, as well as the National Day Laborer Organizing Network
(NDLON) and Puente Arizona.48 Juan Rodriguez recalled the moment in late
2009 that he was spurred to begin the campaign:
I’m leaving. . . . I can’t keep waiting for them to give me an answer,
hoping that maybe SOMEDAY, someone will actually listen to my
question. I can’t just stay here in my daily cycles acting like this way of
life is manageable or bearable. It isn’t. It can NEVER be bearable to
lose the people that we love. It can NEVER be bearable to wake up
each morning and know that people in our communities have
disappeared—taken in the darkness of the night by those that claim
to be keeping our communities “secure.”49

The Trail of DREAMS was motivated by a strong sense of frustration with
the wait for progress in D.C., as well as the ongoing deportations and an expanding
S-Comm program. On April 23, 2010, while the students were walking, Arizona
Governor Jan Brewer signed SB 1070—the Support Our Law Enforcement and
Safe Neighborhoods Act50—into law.51 The legislation, drafted by then-law professor and “issue entrepreneur” Kris Kobach, carried forward the enforcement-only
approach that animated the 2006 Sensenbrenner Bill and empowered local crim46.
47.
48.
49.
50
51.

David Montgomery, Trail of Dream Students Walk 1,500 Miles to Bring Immigration Message to
Washington, WASH. POST (May 1, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/04/30/AR2010043001384.html [https://perma.cc/B7LR-2FGG].
About, TRAIL DREAMS, http://trail2010.org/about/#NYC [https://perma.cc/LC8E-MR3X].
Id.
Juan Rodriguez, New Year’s Day 2010, TRAIL DREAMS (Jan. 1, 2010), http://trail2010.org/
blog/2010/jan/1/new-years-day-2010 [https://perma.cc/3ZVF-LHQM].
Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Ariz. 2010) (codified in scattered sections of ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. titles 11, 13, 23, 28, 41).
Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/us/politics/24immig.html [https://perma.cc/KJ2Z-QN76].
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inal justice actors in Arizona to stop, arrest, and convict those suspected of being
undocumented.52 After this development, the student walk to Washington, D.C.
culminated in meetings with Administration officials and a protest on May 1,
2010, timed to coincide with nationwide demonstrations against the new Arizona law.53 Thirty-five people, including Illinois Representative Luis Gutierrez, were
arrested in front of the White House.54 Nicholls noted that “dissident
DREAMers in Los Angeles, Chicago, Michigan, and New York felt the time
was right to escalate the struggle.”55 They agitated against the new Arizona law
and, at the federal level, came to embrace a standalone bill focused on DREAMers
and the AgJOBS bill (which would have provided immigration status to a class of
farmworkers)56 rather than continuing to wait for movement on CIR.57
The expanding network of student leaders and their quest for a standalone
DREAM Act had the support of NDLON and lawyers from the Mexican
American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), as well as the
UCLA Labor Center, a key bridge-building institution in Southern California.58
NDLON maintained a small legal department and collaborated extensively
with MALDEF in its earlier campaigns in defense of day laborers in various

52.

53.
54.
55.
56
57

58.

See S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, The Importance of the Political in
Immigration Federalism, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1431, 1445 (2012) (“Our framework highlights the
influence of these issue entrepreneurs in creating optimal conditions for subnational immigration
regulation, framing the narrative necessary for judicial and political acceptance of restrictionist
legislation, and targeting specific jurisdictions with partisan conditions that are ripe for enacting
such regulation, with an eye to more widespread adoption.”); Alia Beard Rau, Arizona Immigration
Law Was Crafted by Rising Star Activist, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (May 31, 2010, 12:00 AM),
http://archive.azcentral.com/news/articles/2010/05/31/20100531arizona-immigration-law-kriskobach.html [https://perma.cc/Q4VW-P5XK].
Julia Preston, Immigration Advocates Rally for Change, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/02/us/02immig.html [https://perma.cc/H6YZ-YWA8].
Immigration Law “Awakened a Sleeping Giant”, CBS NEWS (May 1, 2010, 10:07 PM), http://
www.cbsnews.com/news/immigration-law-awakened-a-sleeping-giant [https://perma.cc/JL4AURL7].
NICHOLLS, supra note 17, at 80.
See H.R. 2414, 111th Cong. (2009)
See Alexander Bolton, Durbin’s Dream Act Could Run Afoul of Schumer’s Bill, HILL (May 24, 2010,
11:44 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/99629-durbins-dream-act-could-run-afoul-ofschumers-bill [https://perma.cc/9EKK-RCER] (describing the competition between standalone
and comprehensive immigration reform bills within Congress).
Nicholls & Fiorito, supra note 17, at 90. MALDEF President and General Counsel Thomas
Saenz made comments as early as 2009 indicating an acceptance of piecemeal reform. Suzanne
Gamboa, Leader Has Back-up Immigration Plan, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Sept. 25, 2009, 2:03
PM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-us-immigration-ap-interview-092509-2009
sep25-story.html [https://perma.cc/XB46-HN5J]. He maintained strong ties to NDLON on its
anti-enforcement work and to student leaders who were rapidly finding their voice and asserting
independent views. Telephone Interview with Chris Newman, Legal Dir., Nat’l Day Labor Org.
Network (June 29, 2016).
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jurisdictions in Southern California.59 According to Nicholls, NDLON saw
strategic advantage in allying its day laborer constituents with the dissident
organizers and provided key legal, organizing, and logistical support to the nascent
movement among undocumented youth.60 NDLON Legal Director Chris
Newman remembers the alliance as being constructed less strategically and more
as a reaction to ineffective theories of social change inherent in the approach of
the other established immigrant rights organizations:
This more radical group came to us to ask for their support as they
were breaking off from the rest. This became the most potent and dynamic element of the movement. . . . We wanted to support them
without contributing to more conflicts in the movement. We quietly
made the infrastructure of NDLON available to the youths. We said,
“If you need office space, we have an office in Washington, DC, here
it is. If you need a place to stay around the country, here is a list of our
organizing staff, you can stay in their houses.” We have made
everything we have available to them: here are our lawyers, here are
our contacts, use them. And, they did.61

While RIFA remained closely aligned with the Administration’s enforcementfirst approach to comprehensive reform, the large and influential immigrant
rights legal organizations that came to Arizona to fight SB 1070—including the
ACLU Immigrant Rights Project (ACLU-IRP) and the National Immigration
Law Center (NILC)—pursued an impact litigation strategy that relied on federal
courts to reinforce a less racist and more nuanced federal approach to immigration
enforcement.62 Ultimately, in 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court, applying preemption doctrine,63 struck down provisions of SB 1070 that enabled the state criminalization of immigration status, but upheld what became known as the “show
your papers” provisions allowing state law enforcement officials to determine the immigration status of anyone they stop or arrest based on reasonable

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See Scott L. Cummings, Litigation at Work: Defending Day Labor in Los Angeles, 58 UCLA L. REV.
1617, 1641–63, 1672–74 (2011) (describing the NDLON-MALDEF alliance in successive day
labor ordinance battles in the region).
NICHOLLS, supra note 17, at 82.
Id. at 83 (quoting Chris Newman).
Telephone Interview with Chris Newman, supra note 58.
Preemption is a doctrine of American constitutional law which stems from notions of federalism
and the Supremacy Clause. Under this principle, Congress has the power to preempt state law. See
Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000). Generally, there are three ways
a state or local law may be preempted; through a federal statute containing an express preemption
provision; in a field that Congress has determined must be regulated through its exclusive
governance; and when state laws conflict with federal law. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S.
387, 398–400 (2012).
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suspicion.64 However, the established advocacy organizations and some of the
lawyers litigating in Arizona had “an allergy [to] justice-based arguments” and did
not invoke white supremacy as a core motivation for the Arizona legislative enactments.65 Lawyers on the ground—most prominently at the ACLU of Arizona—had strong ties with community organizations and consistently worked to
integrate their narratives, particularly around race, into the SB 1070 litigation.66
The litigation team was large; no one doubted the racial animus embedded in the
Arizona enactments, but lawyers had differing levels of commitment to advancing movement narratives in litigation. The emphasis of some of the public
interest litigators and the federal government was on constructing effective legal arguments and not necessarily on building political power on the ground.67
64.
65.
66.

67.

Arizona, 567 U.S. 387, 411–15.
Telephone Interview with Chris Newman, supra note 58.
E-mail from Annie Lai, former Staff Atty., ACLU of Ariz., to author (Aug. 29, 2017, 07:37 PST)
(on file with author); see, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, at 47–51, 56, 60,
Friendly House v. Whiting, 846 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (D. Ariz. 2012) (No. CV 10-1061), 2010 WL
11417816 (including race-based allegations and Equal Protection and Section 1981 claims).
Friendly House was a parallel case to the one ultimately heard by the U.S. Supreme Court and
brought by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). See Arizona, 567 U.S. 387. Local and
movement-centered lawyers had significantly less influence in the conduct of the DOJ litigation.
E-mail from Annie Lai, supra note 66. The open question is whether the content of arguments in
complaints and briefs irretrievably shape or limit the scope of narratives that can be used outside of
court to undertake political mobilizations. Former MALDEF litigator Kristina M. Campbell
thinks that legal argument matters in her analysis of the use of the First Amendment in the defense
of day laborers. See generally Kristen M. Campbell, The High Cost of Free Speech: Anti-Solicitation
Ordinances, Day Laborers, and the Impact of “Backdoor” Local Immigration Regulations, 25 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 27–32 (2010). Campbell posits that the litigation strategy trades away a necessary
focus on racism in law enforcement—which would support an equal protection argument—for
short-term success in the courts. Id. Hiroshi Motomura challenges the alleged mutual exclusivity
of litigation strategy, instead arguing that preemption doctrine may serve as a container for equal
protection concerns in litigation. Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and
Immigration Outside the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1731–46.
[P]reemption and equal protection can function roughly as alternative vehicles for
expressing concern about racial and ethnic discrimination. Plaintiffs will likely lose
an equal protection argument because of the law’s requirement of discriminatory intent
and its presumption against finding it. A preemption argument can manage doubt
differently by shifting the risk of uncertain knowledge from the plaintiff to state and
local governments. Courts may sustain preemption challenges out of concern that
state and local laws addressing unauthorized migration give state and local actors a
zone of discretion that is too broad because it enables improper reliance on race and
ethnicity.
Id. at 1744. But see David S. Rubenstein, Black-Box Immigration Federalism, 114 MICH. L. REV.
983, 1006–12 (2016) (book review) (characterizing as unlikely the wide use by courts of
preemption doctrine as a proxy for equal protection); see also Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to
Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 YALE L.J. 763, 768–72 (1995) (arguing for
expanding the scope of factual matter included in civil rights complaints so as to provide courts and
other readers of legal argument with a deeper understanding of the injustices being alleged). In the
Freedom of Information Act litigation described in the next section, see infra Section I.C,
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From the crucible in Arizona, NDLON’s alliance with the dissident organizers gained strength. NDLON was involved on the ground through its Alto
Arizona campaign in collaboration with local activists such as Salvador Reza
with Tonatierra68 and Carlos Garcia with Puente Arizona.69 The expanding
youth-led organizations in Southern California mobilized for protests and other
campaign activity in Arizona on a regular basis and came to rely on NDLON’s
logistical and organizing support.70 In Newman’s words, the campaign work in
Arizona created a “stage” or “scaffolding” that galvanized the media’s coverage of
events in the state.71 He also believes that the escalating street organizing ultimately acted as “amicus” in the Supreme Court case.72
C.

Interior Enforcement

For the dissident organizers, the lack of progress on CIR and the established
advocacy organizations’ opposition to a standalone DREAM Act was juxtaposed
with the expansion of the deportation apparatus. Following the failed Bush
playbook on CIR, the Obama Administration continued to escalate immigration enforcement in the interior of the country, which had been significantly
ramped up in 1986 and then again following 9/11.73 One of the core Obama
Administration strategies was the use of the S-Comm program to transfer targets
efficiently from local law enforcement to ICE for detention and removal.74
Though the Obama enforcement strategy was quieter and less performative than
the Bush approach, it was nonetheless devastating to families and communities.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

73.

74.

NDLON and its lawyers followed Eastman’s imperative and included an expansive group of
allegations in the federal complaint, going well beyond open records law.
For information about the activist work of Tonatierra, see Movimiento Macehualli, TONATIERRA,
http://www.tonatierra.org/movimiento-macehualli [https://perma.cc/P7WR-PU86].
For information about Puente, see Alto Arizona, PUENTE MOVEMENT, http://puenteaz.org/
campaigns/past-campaigns/alto-arizona [https://perma.cc/6P9V-3M26].
See NICHOLLS, supra note 17, at 166.
Telephone Interview with Chris Newman, supra note 58.
Id.; cf. Linda Greenhouse, The Lower Floor, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (May 2, 2012, 9:00
PM),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/02/the-lower-floor [https://perma.cc/
SG2R-TTCJ] (lamenting the absence of consideration for human suffering in the oral argument
of Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012)).
See Anil Kalhan, The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Implications of Interior Immigration Enforcement,
41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1137, 1149–68 (2008) (describing expansion of interior immigration
enforcement since the enactment of employer sanctions in the Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986).
See SECURE COMMUNITIES PLAN, supra note 34, at 1.
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Deportation levels remained at a historic high point in 2010 and 2011 and hit
new peaks in 2012 and 2013.75
It was challenging to formulate a strategy to oppose S-Comm. The dichotomy
between “good” and “bad” immigrants was a core premise of CIR advocates who
sought to enact legislation that would offer a path to citizenship for some undocumented immigrants while increasing interior enforcement resources and
hardening the southern border with Mexico.76 S-Comm extended this dichotomy
and sought to use local authorities more extensively to sift “bad” immigrants out
of the undocumented population in the United States.77 The tight embrace of
CIR by established advocacy organizations—committing them to the assumption
that immigrants who commit crimes in the United States did not deserve a path
to citizenship—made it difficult for them to oppose S-Comm. Indeed, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano’s discussion in
2009 on the first anniversary of S-Comm focused extensively on the criminals
and gang members purportedly targeted by the program.78 However, local
advocates suspected, based on individual deportation cases, that the population
being targeted for detention and deportation included many immigrants without
significant criminal history, not just among those stopped at the border, but also
among residents who had spent significant time in the United States. This

75.

76.

77.

78.

Ana Gonzalez-Barrera & Jens Manuel Krogstad, U.S. Immigrant Deportations Declined in 2014,
but Remain Near Record High, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 31, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2016/08/31/u-s-immigrant-deportations-declined-in-2014-but-remain-near-record-high
[https://perma.cc/C5FL-ZYU2].
See Muneer I. Ahmad, Beyond Earned Citizenship, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 257, 273–90
(2017) (analyzing conditional path to citizenship in 2010 CIR legislation and the neoliberal and
penal assumptions about undocumented people underlying those conditions); Angélica Cházaro,
Beyond Respectability: Dismantling the Harms of “Illegality”, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 355, 373–87
(2015) (cataloging problematic narratives advanced in arguments for legalization); Elizabeth Keyes,
Beyond Saints and Sinners: Discretion and the Need for New Narratives in the U.S. Immigration System,
26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 207, 226–37 (2012) (discussing the dichotomization in immigration
adjudication of “good” and “bad” immigrants). But see Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The
Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 824–35 (2007) (describing ex
post screening of immigrants on the basis of criminal history as a rational approach to immigration
policy-making and adjudication).
S-Comm also swept in legal permanent residents (or “green card” holders) who had committed
crimes that made them deportable under federal law. See MICHELE WASLIN, IMMIGRATION
POLICY CTR., THE SECURE COMMUNITIES PROGRAM: UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AND
CONTINUING CONCERNS 4 (2011), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/
files/research/Secure_Communities_112911_updated.pdf [https://perma.cc/CQ4Q-7U27].
See Editorial, The “Secure Communities” Illusion, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2014), https://www.
nytimes.com/2014/09/06/opinion/the-secure-communities-illusion.html
[https://perma.cc/3QEP-RWX4] (indicating that Janet Napolitano, secretary of DHS, later
walked back claims about the number of serious convicted criminals deported as a consequence of
the program).
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over-inclusive enforcement approach would have been consistent with the overall
mix of deportees in the years prior, and was thought to have been advanced during the Bush administration so that ICE agents could meet numerical arrest and
removal goals.79
This suspicion regarding S-Comm was shared by both NDLON and the
dissident organizers who were closest to the families and communities affected by
the program. In the same month that SB 1070 was enacted in Arizona,
NDLON, the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), and the Benjamin
Cardozo School of Law Immigration Justice Clinic (Cardozo) brought Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) litigation against the federal government in National
Day Laborer Organization Network v. United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency.80 NDLON Legal Director Newman and Puente lead organizer
Carlos Garcia had met CCR attorney Sunita Patel at an Open Society
Foundations conference on the convergence of criminal justice reform and
immigrant rights and discussed how to head “where the hockey puck is going
to.”81 Cardozo clinic director Peter Markowitz remembers being frustrated by
the sense that they were fighting yesterday’s battles, when new threats were imminent.82
Though the complaint was focused on the release of data on arrest, detention,
and deportations resulting from the S-Comm program, it included paragraphs
alleging racial profiling, potential pre-textual arrests by local police, and accounts
of low priority deportees who appeared to have committed no significant
offense.83 NDLON lawyer Jessica Bansal called the use of FOIA in this case
“advocacy through inquiry.”84 NDLON, CCR, and Cardozo created a website,
“Uncover the Truth,” on which they revealed information and analysis from

79.

80.

81.
82.
83.
84.

See MARGOT MENDELSON ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., COLLATERAL DAMAGE: AN
EXAMINATION OF ICE’S FUGITIVE OPERATIONS PROGRAM 10 (2009), https://www.law.yale
.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/Clinics/wirac_CollateralDamage.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
2YHK-GAJP] (describing a 1000 arrests per ICE Fugitive Operations Team quota that was
imposed as of 2006 and correlated with a significant increase in arrests of noncriminal immigrants).
811 F. Supp. 2d 713 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). The groups later brought in Mayer Brown, LLP to help
manage the volume of documents turned over by DHS in the litigation. NDLON was lead
plaintiff but not an attorney of record in the case. National Day Laborer Organization Network
(NDLON) v. US Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency, CTR. CONST. RTS. (Aug. 7,
2013),
https://ccrjustice.org/home/what-we-do/our-cases/national-day-laborer-organizing-net
work-ndlon-v-us-immigration-and-customs [https://perma.cc/FNT8-FAPQ].
Telephone Interview with Chris Newman, supra note 58.
Telephone Interview with Peter Markowitz, Professor, Cardozo Sch. of Law (June 28, 2016).
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 12, Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network, 877 F.
Supp. 2d 87 (No. 10-CV-3488).
Interview with Jessica Bansal, Litigation Dir., Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network, Class Lecture at
University of California, Irvine School of Law (Feb. 21, 2013).
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successive waves of documents released over the course of the litigation starting
in August 2010.85 The records largely confirmed the mismatch between the public safety rhetoric espoused by federal enforcement authorities and the actual
population subject to detention and deportation as a result of the program.86
The data and case stories made public through the Uncover the Truth
campaign fueled two distinct forms of local opposition strategies. First, local
activists opposed the detention and removal of particular individuals by bringing
attention to the equities that they possessed. Even those with criminal convictions
had families, employers, pastors, organizers, and others who would speak out on
their behalf. The local activists also raised particularly egregious examples of federal overreach—the attempted removal of a domestic violence victim wrongly
arrested by local police, for example87—on social media (with the hashtag
“Not1More”) and in traditional media.88 These individual cases were portrayed
by activists and advocates as emblematic of S-Comm and consistent with the statistics being released through the FOIA litigation.
The second form of local advocacy fueled by data uncovered through
National Day Laborer Organizing Network v. United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency was the proliferation of S-Comm opt-out campaigns in
jurisdictions across the country. As they learned about the mismatch between the
anti-crime rhetoric of the program and the actual targets of enforcement, cities,
counties, and states, encouraged by advocates and immigrant rights attorneys, were
attempting to opt out of cooperating with federal enforcement agencies. On
85.
86.

87.
88.

Uncover The Truth: ICE and Police Collaborations, UNCOVERTHETRUTH.ORG, [https://perma.cc/
3CBM-PUTD].
NDLON nested insights from the Freedom of Information Act records in a broader report that
includes contributions by local police officials, individuals who have been targeted for deportation,
and community-based organizations that were monitoring rollout of the program. See generally
NAT’L CMTY. ADVISORY COMM’N, RESTORING COMMUNITY: A NATIONAL COMMUNITY
ADVISORY REPORT ON ICE’S FAILED “SECURE COMMUNITIES” PROGRAM 27 (2011),
http://altopolimigra.com/documents/FINAL-Shadow-Report-regular-print.pdf [https://perma.
cc/E4NC-S3LR].
See, e.g., Domestic Violence Survivor Calls Police and Is Detained, Could Be Deported, #NOT1MORE,
http://www.notonemoredeportation.com/portfolio/marcela [https://perma.cc/D8QY-KJZ4].
Local activists originated strategies with little outside guidance, particularly with regard to the
mounting of public campaigns in cases in which individuals have no discernible relief from
deportation. Dozens of deportations nation-wide have been halted as a result of national
mobilizations led by undocumented youth, who have organized mass letter-writing, call-in and
online petitions. These campaigns are person-specific, launched as deportation dates draw near,
calling for a stay of deportation in the short term and amnesty in the longer term. Genevieve
Negrón-Gonzalez, Undocumented, Unafraid and Unapologetic: Re-articulatory Practices and Migrant
Youth “Illegality”, 12 LATINO STUD. 259, 274 (2014). Movement organizers have tried to capture
their methods for new organizers and activists. E.g., Introduction, #NOT1MORE, http://www.
notonemoredeportation.com/resources/introduction [https://perma.cc/CYL8-YMCB] (presenting
the introduction to a resource titled “Anti-Deportations Toolkit”).
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May 18, 2010, San Francisco County Sheriff Mike Hennessey sent a letter to
ICE and then-California Attorney General Jerry Brown requesting further
information about participation in S-Comm, saying that he was “concerned
about the unintended consequences of ICE technology.”89 In August, he wrote
again to opt out of the program.90 Santa Clara County Counsel and the San
Mateo County Board of Supervisors requested clarification of the participation
requirements in that same time period.91 In response to a congressional inquiry
in September 2010, DHS Secretary Napolitano first indicated that jurisdictions
may opt out of S-Comm with appropriate notice.92 One month later, she revoked
that advisal, saying: “We don’t consider Secure Communities an opt-in, opt-out
program.”93 NDLON, CCR, and Cardozo filed for an emergency injunction on
October 28, 2010, seeking critical documents on the ability of jurisdictions to opt
out of S-Comm.94 The requests for nonparticipation fed the confusion within
DHS concerning the participation rules of the flagship interior enforcement
program. In many ways, this political process provided a blueprint for local immigration enforcement organizing and the template for the “uncooperative federalism” that we see in the current efforts to create sanctuary jurisdictions.95

89.
90.

91.

92.
93.
94.
95.

Letter from Michael Hennessey, Sheriff, City & Cty. of S.F., to Edmund G. Brown, Cal.
Attorney Gen. (May 18, 2010), http://uncoverthetruth.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/SheriffHennessey-Ltr-Opting-Out-of-S-1-Comm-5-18-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3VX-QLH7].
Letter from Michael Hennessey, Sheriff, City & Cty. of S.F., to Edmund G. Brown, Cal.
Attorney Gen., David Venturella, Exec. Dir., DHS Office of Secure Cmtys., & Marc Rapp, Dep.
Dir., DHS Office of Secure Cmtys. (Aug. 31, 2010), http://media1.s-nbcnews.com/i/MSNBC/
Sections/NEWS/z_Personal/AJohnson/Secure-Comunities-Setting-the-Record-Straight.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7CJX-58W3].
Letter from Richard Gordon, President, San Mateo Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, to John Morton,
Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t (July 21, 2010) http://uncoverthetruth.org/wp
-content/uploads/2010/09/Letter-Morton-072110.pdf [https://perma.cc/3EC4-6BV9]; Letter
from Miguel Marquez, Cty. Counsel, Cty. of Santa Clara, to David Venturella, Exec. Dir., Secure
Cmtys. (Aug. 16, 2010), http://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/files/SCC%20County%
20Counsel%20letter%20to%20Venturella.pdf [https://perma.cc/78VN-F77B].
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., COMMUNICATION REGARDING
PARTICIPATION IN SECURE COMMUNITIES 12 (2012), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/library/
P6276.pdf [https://perma.cc/GBK9-HYCF].
Dara Lind, Why Cities Are Rebelling Against the Obama Administration’s Deportation Policies, VOX
(June 6, 2014, 11:00 AM) http://www.vox.com/2014/6/6/5782610/secure-communities-citiescounties-ice-dhs-obama-detainer-reform [https://perma.cc/R8H6-W8KN] (quoting Napolitano).
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network v. U.S. Immigration
Customs & Enf’t Agency, 877 F. Supp. 2d 87 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 10-3488).
See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE
L.J. 1256 (2009) (theorizing states, sometimes disobedient, as internal critics of federal policy).
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D. Executive Discretion
As noted above, another major animating force in the activism against interior immigration enforcement in this period was NDLON’s Alto Arizona
campaign. The racial animus of Sheriff Joe Arpaio against Latinx communities
in Arizona was clear; established advocacy organizations feared that a focus on
Arizona would siphon resources from the campaign to pass CIR96 and prevent
Republicans in Congress from working with them on a bipartisan bill.97 Dealmaking, in their view, appeared to rely on not offending the sensibilities of
immigration restrictionists in and out of Congress.98 This deepened the divide
within RIFA. NDLON and its dissident organizing allies emphatically disagreed with the strategy to diminish the importance of SB 1070,99 as five other
states—Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, Utah, and Indiana—enacted copycat
bills.100 Through its Alto Arizona Campaign, NDLON partnered with grassroots
organizations Tonatierra and Puente in Phoenix to initiate public demonstrations.101
Other activists also mobilized against SB 1070 and Arpaio. Student leaders mounted
a sit-in at the Tucson office of Senator John McCain in May 2010, especially significant because he was seen as an ally by many within the reform coalition.102

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

NICHOLLS, supra note 17, at 78.
Telephone Interview with Chris Newman, supra note 58.
Id.
Id.
Arizona’s SB 1070, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/immigrants-rights/state-and-localimmigration-laws/arizonas-sb-1070 [https://perma.cc/VBS6-RCDK].
101. Telephone Interview with Chris Newman, supra note 58.
102. Julia Preston, Illegal Immigrant Students Protest at McCain Office, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/18/us/18dream.html [https://perma.cc/6BXX-ZLUS]. This
was apparently the first demonstration in this wave of immigrant activism in which undocumented
students put themselves at risk of arrest. Id. When asked how the decision to stage such a
confrontational action was made, one of the sit-in participants offered this explanation:
We wanted to take ownership of our lives and our future. We decided to do it
inside his office, because outside—they would close the office, lock us out. We need
to be in their space, it’s a direct thing, that’s the purpose of direct action.
You need to be completely unafraid and face your biggest fear. Putting ourselves
in front of a huge obstacle. Doing it face to face. Going to his office.
Negrón-Gonzalez, supra note 88, at 271. The specter of arrest and possible deportation of
undocumented students hung over every civil disobedience action undertaken by the dissident
organizers. There were committed attorneys, particularly immigration defense specialists, who
strongly counseled undocumented youth to stay away from direct action protests at various points
in the development of these campaigns. See, e.g., Miriam Jordan, Anatomy of a Deferred-Action
Dream, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 14, 2012, 8:46 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000
872396390443982904578046951916986168 (“‘I told them not to walk, because it was too risky,’
says Cheryl Little, an immigrant-rights attorney. She worried that they would face arrest and
possible deportation.”).
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Dream Team Los Angeles103 occupied the federal building on Wilshire Boulevard
later that May and shut down a busy thoroughfare.104 Nine students and their
allies were arrested in the demonstration.105 Groups of student leaders across the
country began hunger strikes.106 Los Angeles activists, led by Neidi Dominguez
and others, organized a Freedom DREAM Ride to Washington, D.C. that culminated in the occupation of an atrium and individual Senate offices on July 20,
2010.107 Twenty-one undocumented students were arrested.108 That same day,
immigrant rights activist Carlos Amador and eight others began a fifteen-day
hunger strike outside of Senator Dianne Feinstein’s Los Angeles office.109
That summer, the split within RIFA broke open. After RIFA leadership
asked NILC and its affiliate United We Dream (UWD), a significant
DREAMer organization with affiliates across the country,110 to tone down their
support for a stand-alone bill,111 UWD came to support the dissident position in
favor of a standalone DREAM Act.112 The Los Angeles-based immigration
advocacy group Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights (CHIRLA) tried to
persuade youth activists in Los Angeles who had come up through their networks
to stick with RIFA and CIR and indicated that they were selfish if they were
supporting a standalone DREAM Act.113 Nicholls keenly identified the dynamic
widening the split between the dominant groups in RIFA and the dissident
organizers:
The strategy of top-down centralization was an appropriate and
sophisticated effort to maximize advantages within the particular

103.

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Undocumented activists themselves wrestled with the risks of participating in movement
activity. See, e.g., Jesus, On Civil Disobedience, DREAMERS ADRIFT (Aug. 21, 2011), http://
dreamersadrift.com/jesus-musings/on-civil-disobedience# [https://perma.cc/DS8G-PKH4].
DREAM Team Los Angeles is a grassroots organization which “aims to create a safe space in
which undocumented immigrants from the community and allies empower themselves through
activism and life stories.” About, DREAM TEAM L.A., http://dreamteamla.org/about-2/ [https://
perma.cc/4FC2-FCTM].
9 Cited in West LA Immigration Rights Protest, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (May 20, 2010, 2:15
PM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-9-cited-in-west-la-immigration-rights-protest
-2010may20-story,amp.html [https://perma.cc/V7D5-LHLT].
Id.
Julianne Hing, How Undocumented Youth Nearly Made Their DREAMs Real in 2010,
COLORLINES (Dec. 20, 2010, 10:21 AM), https://www.colorlines.com/articles/how-undocu
mented-youth-nearly-made-their-dreams-real-2010 [https://perma.cc/9UDR-8PCZ].
Jordan, supra note 102.
Id.
Id.
Id.
NICHOLLS, supra note 17, at 76.
See id. at 87–88.
Id. at 88–89.
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context. However, the strategy had two major drawbacks: first the act
of maintaining discipline over a diverse movement aggravated powerful
conflicts within it. While DREAMers and antienforcement activists
were drawn into other battles, RIFA placed great pressure on them to
focus all their attention on the passage of comprehensive reform.
Rather than corralling these dissenters, RIFA’s actions only accelerated
their separation. Second, when political opportunities did not materialize, the centralization strategy proved to be inflexible. . . . Instead of
shifting to different fronts, RIFA doubled-down and committed itself
to a costly strategy that was bearing no fruits. This strengthened the
hand of critics and dissidents, which precipitated the decline of RIFA
and its strategy of movement centralization.114

The dissident organizers were successfully originating a set of mobilization
methods and distinct strategic goals. They were finding a voice of their own,
independent of the better-resourced wings of RIFA.115
By fall 2010, the ground had shifted significantly, such that RIFA stalwarts
CHIRLA, Center for Community Change, America’s Voice, and National
Council of La Raza began to support the standalone DREAM Act.116 However,
in light of their recent hostility to the dissident position, student leaders
distrusted the motives of the mainstream advocates.117 Meanwhile, Democratic
Majority Leader Harry Reid was unable to muster the sixty votes he needed to
prevent a filibuster of a standalone DREAM Act in the lame duck session at the
end of 2010.118
The S-Comm opt-out campaign expanded as NDLON, CCR, and
Cardozo pushed for relevant documents through the litigation. Opposition to
the program gained momentum in a series of developments in the first half of
2011. In a January 2011 report, the Migration Policy Institute, a D.C.-based
think tank, warned of the probability of racial profiling and pre-textual arrests:
“Indeed, Secure Communities may even be more susceptible to this problem
since there are no formal agreements defining the activities of participating law
enforcement agencies, and local officers do not receive federal training in immigration enforcement.”119 DHS Secretary Napolitano was pressed on S-Comm in
114. Id. at 166.
115. Id. at 16–17 (“Being able to speak in the public sphere was viewed as a precondition of equality, so
116.
117.
118.
119.

the act of representing became not simply a means to an end, as the association believed, but rather
an end in its own right.”).
Id. at 90–91.
Id. at 91.
Jordan, supra note 102.
RANDY CAPPS ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., DELEGATION AND DIVERGENCE: A
STUDY OF 287(G) STATE AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 49 (2011), http://www.
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a March meeting with dissident activists, including Natalia Aristizabal, who
pointed out that DREAMers were being deported.120 In May 2011, Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren requested an investigation by the DHS Inspector General
as to the focus of the program on “dangerous criminal aliens, . . . the accuracy of
ICE’s data collection, [and] the controversy regarding communities’ requirement
to participate and the ability to ‘opt-out’ of the program.”121 Also in May, the
Congressional Hispanic Caucus called on the President to suspend S-Comm,
saying “evidence reveals not only a striking dissonance between the program’s
stated purpose of removing dangerous criminals and its actual effect; it also suggests that S-Comm may endanger the public, particularly among communities of
color.”122 The politics surrounding S-Comm had shifted significantly.
The local opt-out campaigns gained strength in several large states. Illinois
terminated its S-Comm agreement with DHS in May 2011;123 New York
suspended its participation one month later.124 Massachusetts declined to sign a
memorandum of agreement with DHS with regard to its participation in SComm, noting concerns about racial profiling and nonreporting of criminal activity.125 In California, a bill to minimize the collaboration of local criminal
justice agencies with federal authorities—the TRUST Act126—was making its
way through the legislature, supported by NDLON and other close institutional
allies, as well as the vibrant network of immigrant youth organizations in the

120.
121.

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/287g-divergence.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KL8EQMG].
Jordan, supra note 102.
Letter from Zoe Lofgren, U.S. Congress, to Charles K. Edwards, Acting DHS Inspector Gen., &
Timothy Moynihan, Assistant Dir., Office of Prof’l Responsibilty, Immigration & Customs Enf’t
(May 17, 2011), http://cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/letter-to-cadman-re-scomm-w-encls-redacted1.pdf [https://perma.cc/UVH3-BYJT] (quoting Letter from Charles K. Edwards, Acting DHS
Inspector Gen., to Zoe Lofgren, U.S. Congress (May 10, 2011), http://cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/
letter-to-cadman-re-scomm-w-encls-redacted-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/UVH3-BYJT]).
Letter from Charles A. Gonzalez, Chairman, Cong. Hispanic Caucus, to Barack Obama, U.S.
President (May 5, 2011), http://uncoverthetruth.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/05-05-11SCOMM-Letter-to-President.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GA9-RHPX].
Julia Preston, States Resisting Program Central to Obama’s Immigration Strategy, N.Y. TIMES (May
5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/06/us/06immigration.html [https://perma.cc/DQR8
-9FVZ].
Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Cuomo Suspends Participation in Federal Secure
Communities Program (June 1, 2011), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomosuspends-participation-federal-secure-communities-program [https://perma.cc/RD3B-6AAR].
Letter from Mary Elizabeth Heffernan, Sec’y, Mass. Exec. Office of Pub. Safety & Sec., to Marc
Rapp, Acting Dir. Secure Comtys. (June 3, 2011), http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/
Massachusetts_Rapp.pdf [https://perma.cc/YYE4-SUD4].
Assemb. B. 4, 2013–14 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 7282–
7282.5 (West Supp. 2017)).
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state.127 One of the immigrant youth organizers working to pass the TRUST
Act articulated a strong intersectional commitment to the struggle against
federal-local immigration enforcement:
It has been a broad coalition. We had a conversation about what the
focus of this coalition should be and we agreed that it should be broad,
and should focus on criminalization and not just immigration. . . .
That would allow all of those [nonimmigrant] organizations . . . to
contribute to this work and put that in their grants. It would also open
up the coalition and really bring in the social justice work that’s going
on, in terms of youth, homeless, and those other perspectives.
NDLON supported this but didn’t want to water down the 287(g)
and Secure Communities point of the coalition either. IDEPSCA
and the normal orgs were at the same table: we can target 287(g) and
Secure Communities but do it through a critique of criminalization.
It’s part of getting to that bigger picture.128

In mid-June 2011, ICE announced changes to S-Comm that critics
characterized as “cosmetic.”129 In the same month, the Obama Administration
127. See Walter J. Nicholls et al., The Networked Grassroots. How Radicals Outflanked Reformists in the

United States’ Immigrant Rights Movement, 42 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 1036, 1048
(2016); see also Gabriel San Roman, Undocumented Caravan Stops in OC Today Along Its Statewide
Pro-TRUST Act Trip, OC WEEKLY (June 26, 2013, 7:30 AM), http://www.ocweekly.com/news/
undocumented-caravan-stops-in-oc-today-along-its-statewide-pro-trust-act-trip-6471864
[https://perma.cc/S6TU-T5SA] (noting participation of NDLON and local youth-led activist
organization RAIZ in the campaign for the TRUST Act in Orange County).
128. NICHOLLS, supra note 17, at 157 (first omission in original) (emphasis omitted). For a description
of the 287(g) program, see RANDY CAPPS ET AL., supra note 119, at 1, which discusses federal
delegation of authority to state and local officers to perform immigration enforcement. The
criminalization frame was an important link between the new movement-centered wing of
immigrant rights advocacy and the Movement for Black Lives that would form after the killing of
Michael Brown in 2014. Sociologist Ruth Milkman traces methodological and conceptual
continuities (including a focus on intersectional analysis) across four movements of millennials in
the aftermath of the 2008 recession: Dreamers, Occupy Wall Street, the campus movement
protesting sexual assault, and Black Lives Matter. Ruth Milkman, A New Political Generation:
Millennials and the Post-2008 Wave of Protest, 82 AM. SOC. REV. 1, 10–25 (2016); see also Michelle
Chen, Phillip Agnew, Dream Defender, THESE TIMES (Jan. 19, 2015), http://inthesetimes.com/
article/17543/ phillip_agnew_dream_defender [https://perma.cc/SB7M-AHKL] (describing link
between Black Lives Matter and Occupy Wall Street). Immigrant activists also appeared to draw
from a shared understanding of the African-American civil rights movement. See NegrónGonzalez, supra note 88, at 268 (describing inspiration drawn by undocumented activists from
Rosa Parks and Cesar Chavez).
129. The changes proposed by ICE included new memos on prosecutorial discretion, the creation of an
advisory committee, a video on S-Comm for law enforcement, tasking the understaffed DHS
Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties with responding to S-Comm complaints, and changes
to the ICE detainer form. The Uncover the Truth campaign catalogued these changes and
critiqued their efficacy in a June 2011 memorandum. UNCOVER THE TRUTH, BRIEFING GUIDE
TO ICE’S MINOR “SECURE COMMUNITIES” MODIFICATIONS (2011), http://uncoverthetruth.
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announced that low-priority immigrant offenders would not be targeted for
deportation under new guidelines.130 In November, the Administration committed to a case-by-case review of approximately 300,000 cases of undocumented
immigrants already in removal proceedings, allowing those who posed no threat
to society to remain in the country.131 Although the selective exercise of discretion may have been intended to prop up S-Comm, it also provided a new path
toward relief in the face of legislative inaction on any kind of immigration
reform.132 UCLA Law Professor Hiroshi Motomura recalls that the turn toward
executive action was a contested one within the reform coalition: “[L]ooking
back at [it], the broadening of advocacy to this certain administrative relief was
something that was initiated more from [the] grassroots . . . that happened while
NILC for example, was still trying to figure out exactly how to balance [legislative
and administrative strategies].”133 Activists such as Neidi Dominguez believed
that this path held promise and organizers on both coasts enlisted attorneys to
make the legal case for a categorical grant of deferred action to DREAMers.134
The effort to secure executive relief gained momentum after Senator Marco
Rubio announced his intention to propose legislation that would provide
nonimmigrant visas, but not citizenship, to undocumented youth.135 One of the
original four student leaders who had walked the Trail of DREAMS in 2010,
Gaby Pacheco, was at the center of subsequent negotiations, along with other
organizers.136 After meeting with Senator Rubio’s chief of staff, Pacheco and her
colleagues walked to Senator Durbin’s office to seek Democratic support for the

130.
131.
132.

133.
134.
135.
136.

org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/S-Comm-Adjustment-Analysis-20110624.pdf [https://perma.
cc/Y269-WD97] (“This briefing guide analyzes the cosmetic adjustments proposed by ICE and
explains why they are woefully inadequate to solve the problems with this troubled deportation
program.”).
Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, to U.S. Immigration
& Customs Enf’t (June 17, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/pro
secutorial-discretion-memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/FT79-HDFW].
See Julia Preston, U.S. to Review Cases Seeking Deportations, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/17/us/deportation-cases-of-illegal-immigrants-to-be-re
viewed.html [https://perma.cc/S8NL-AFNV].
DHS Secretary Napolitano now characterized the exercise of categorical discretion as an extension
of S-Comm rather than in any way undermining the program. Telephone Interview with Chris
Newman, supra note 58. Eventually, even Administration officials acknowledged that the
campaigns against S-Comm had created space for them to advocate for administrative relief
internally. Id.
Telephone Interview with Hiroshi Motomura, Professor, UCLA Sch. of Law (June 27, 2016).
Jordan, supra note 102. MALDEF President and General Counsel Tom Saenz also had a key role
in validating a categorical discretionary approach. Telephone Interview with Chris Newman, supra
note 58.
Jordan, supra note 102.
Id.
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Rubio proposal.137 They then went to meet with Obama Senior Advisor Valerie
Jarrett and White House Domestic Policy Council Director Cecilia Muñoz.138
UWD’s Lorella Praeli indicated in the meeting that they had legal analysis that
supported their position—that they “were well-armed.”139 Jarrett promised to
schedule a meeting between the activists and White House attorneys.140
NDLON Legal Director Newman thinks that the meeting with Rubio’s office
and the Administration’s awareness of that meeting was a turning point in the
debate within the White House, as officials came to realize that they were dealing
with an “unconstrained opposition” in an election year.141
After rallies outside of detention centers, federal buildings, and Obama
campaign offices on May 17—as well as increasing pressure on Napolitano to fix
the mismatch between the Administration’s stated goals and its actual apprehension and deportation policy—the activists got their meeting with attorneys from
the White House. Lawyers helped movement leaders prepare. Leaders met in
Los Angeles with their lawyers from NDLON, MALDEF, NILC, and the Yale
Law School Worker and Immigrant Rights Advocacy Clinic.142 On May 25,
Napolitano apparently stunned her staff by suggesting that they exercise discretionary relief for all of those who would have benefitted from the DREAM
Act.143 When UCLA law professor Motomura volunteered to draft a letter on
May 28 outlining the historical precedent for the exercise of executive discretion
with NDLON attorney Jessica Bansal and several others, he thought of his clients
as being “the loose group of students who were pushing for this.”144 The activists
brought their lawyers—Bansal from NDLON, Betty Hung from Asian
Americans Advancing Justice, Florida immigration defense attorney Cheryl Little,
and Yale clinic director Muneer Ahmad—to the May 29 meeting145 in Washington and indicated that they wanted an answer on whether the Administration
would act by mid-June; if it did not act, they would “escalate.”146 Napolitano
shared details about a discretionary relief plan with White House officials on
May 30 and 31.147 She received approval to proceed on June 11.148 It appears
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Telephone Interview with Chris Newman, supra note 58.
Interview with Hiroshi Motomura, supra note 133.
Jordan, supra note 102.
Interview with Hiroshi Motomura, supra note 133.
Interview with Jessica Bansal, supra note 84.
Jordan, supra note 102.
Id.
Id.
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that the convergence of outside pressure and Napolitano’s vigorous support within
the administration made executive relief palatable within the White House.
President Obama announced the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals on
June 15, 2012.149 And so began another phase in the fight for immigrant rights.
II.

RESISTANCE AND AGENCY

Undocumented youth and leading organizers were the protagonists of the
story just told.150 They did in some ways what we might expect them to do based
on the closely observed accounts of laypeople confronting legality in all of its
manifestations, formal and informal. But they also upset expectations as they
fought to express their “contentious citizenship.”151 This Part places the actions
of activists and their lawyers in the fight for immigrant rights within the sociolegal framework of law and resistance and extends that literature. The immigrant
rights struggle reveals a process of resistance to law, one that begins and ends with
courageous activists but that incorporates creative and committed lawyers. This
Part focuses on the role of lawyers in the process of social movement-based
resistance to law; the next and final Part of this Article focuses on the social
resources co-generated through collaborations between organizers and lawyers in
the fight for immigrant rights.
A.

Resisting Legality

The legal academic literature is replete with references to lawyers suppressing
or usurping the agency of the less privileged people that they represent.152 The
149. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, supra note 12.
150. Cf. Jennifer Gordon, The Lawyer Is Not the Protagonist: Community Campaigns, Law, and Social

Change, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2133, 2140–41 (2007) (describing community lawyering model in
which client groups rather than lawyers are the protagonists in campaigns for social change).
151. Kathryn Abrams, Contentious Citizenship: Undocumented Activism in the Not1More Deportation
Campaign, 26 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 46, 64 (2016) (describing the increasingly contentious
character of undocumented activism). Abrams, in describing undocumented activism as
“contentious,” draws on the work of social movement theorists Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly.
See generally SIDNEY TARROW, POWER IN MOVEMENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND
CONTENTIOUS POLITICS (2d ed. 1998); CHARLES TILLY, THE CONTENTIOUS FRENCH (1986).
152. See, e.g., LÓPEZ, supra note 7; Alfieri, Antinomies of Poverty, supra note 9; Michelle S. Jacobs, People
From the Footnotes: The Missing Element in Client-Centered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 345 (1997); White, supra note 8; see also, e.g., COREY S. SHDAIMAH, NEGOTIATING
JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE LAWYERING, LOW-INCOME CLIENTS, AND THE QUEST FOR
SOCIAL CHANGE 163–65 (2009) (critiquing the critical mind-set in scholarship on public interest
lawyering); Lauren B. Edelman et al., On Law, Organizations, and Social Movements, 6 ANN. REV.
L. & SOC. SCI. 653, 663 (2010) (“[L]awyers direct movement activity into legal channels,
potentially snuffing out sustained collective action in favor of ‘associations without members.’”
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critical urge that swept left legal scholarship in the 1970s and 1980s has had
resounding influence on the development of the progressive, public interest segment of the legal profession.153 The scope of public interest law since the Reagan
Administration has been constrained significantly by cutbacks in governmental
funding and restraints on the avenues by which to contest the significant social
problems that confront poor clients. The profession has reacted to external discipline by pulling back from larger social engineering projects and retrenching in
the cloistered work of individual representation. It reflected what Joel Handler
evocatively—if not precisely—called the postmodern turn away from transformational politics.154 The studies (and the law school pedagogy) bore in on the
microcosmic psychological implications of the lawyer-client relationship.155
Within the socio-legal literature, there was a related shift to discern and
document the phenomenon of “everyday resistance.”156 The scholars who considered the issue had a rich understanding of law as not existing outside of social life,
but instead as embedded “within the tapestry of ordinary lives and everyday
events.”157 Austin Sarat found that, much as for the undocumented activists who
led the three-year fight for DACA, the individuals that he interviewed in welfare
offices were unyieldingly enmeshed in legal rules and practices, with significant
portions of their lives under the jurisdiction of arbitrary bureaucrats and vulnerable
to the predations of private actors.158 For these individuals, the law is “an enclosure seen from the inside.”159 People are excluded from participating in the

153.
154.

155.
156.

157.
158.
159.

(quoting Theda Skocpol, Associations Without Members, AM. PROSPECT, July–Aug. 1999, at 66
(1999))); id. at 665 (“[L]egally institutionalized frames may also influence the activists that use
them in subtle and disabling ways.”).
Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L.
REV. 443, 450–69 (2001).
Joel F. Handler, Postmodernism, Protest, and the New Social Movements, 26 L. & SOC’Y REV. 697,
710–16 (1992). But see Michael W. McCann, Resistance, Reconstruction, and Romance in Legal
Scholarship, 26 L. & SOC’Y REV. 733, 734–37 (1992) (criticizing Handler’s incomplete and
undertheorized use of post-modernism).
Sameer M. Ashar, Law Clinics and Collective Mobilization, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 355, 380–83
(2008); William H. Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32 STAN. L. REV.
487, 525–59 (1980).
JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE, AND THE
LIMITS OF PRIVACY 12 (2001) (emphasis added); see Anna-Maria Marshall & Scott Barclay, In
Their Own Words: How Ordinary People Construct the Legal World, 28 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 617, 621
(2003) (“More recently, legal consciousness research has shifted away from this ‘institutionally
centered, law-first perspective’ in favor of a focus on everyday life in commonplace locations like
workplaces, schools, and neighborhoods.” (quoting PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE
COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE 20 (1998))); see, e.g., Richard A.
Brisbin, Jr., Resistance to Legality, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 25 (2010).
Ewick & Silbey, Conformity, supra note 5, at 732.
See Sarat, supra note 6, at 344.
Id. at 345.
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constructions of legality through which they are oppressed.160 Sarat’s subjects are
able to find narrow spaces in which to contest bureaucratic decision-making, particularly if they have the assistance of willing legal services attorneys. However,
they believed that their lawyers were an important component of state oppression,
operating through “regulation and internal surveillance rather than prohibition
and punishment.”161 Lawyers have the power to assist those subject to law if they
deign to do so and possess the power to correct mistakes, but they lack the capacity
to take apart the bureaucratic structure within which they themselves are also
trapped.162
Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey redefined legality to include a broader
range of engagements within and without formal legal contexts.163 They argued
that people had the capacity to “identify the cracks and vulnerabilities of institutionalized power,”164 expose social structure, and perhaps momentarily reverse the
usual direction in which that power flowed.165 Kathryn Abrams’s more recent
accounts of undocumented youth activists in Phoenix and Chicago tell a parallel
story about resistance to legality. Undocumented youth perform a “contentious
citizenship” by taking on the responsibilities of national belonging—participating
politically, contesting policies and practices, and reshaping public discourse—
while remaining without de jure recognition as citizens and under the constant
threat of arrest and deportation.166 Abrams thinks that both the hybrid position
of undocumented youth, with strong claims to membership, and the rising local
activism in the period on which she is focused (just after the end of the narrative
in Part I of this Article) might explain their resistance and political agency.167
In Sarat’s account of enclosed subjects, lawyers are unreliable actors embedded
within an oppressive bureaucracy. In Ewick and Silbey’s and Abrams’s narratives,
lawyers are not quite visible, as individuals create moments of agency against
institutionalized power.168 The fight for immigrant rights described in this Article
reveals a different process of resistance to legality, one that draws on the courage
and creativity of those who are subject to law, acting in conjunction with movement lawyers.

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

See id. at 377.
Id. at 353.
Id.
Ewick & Silbey, Narrating, supra note 5, at 1340 n.6.
Id. at 1330.
See id. at 1329–31.
See Abrams, supra note 151, at 66–69.
Id. at 62–63; see supra Part I.
But see Kathryn Abrams, Emotions in the Mobilization of Rights, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 551,
573–88 (2011) (interpreting emotional responses of claimants and implications for lawyering).
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Reconstructing Legality

Undocumented activists have fought for inclusion through legalization even
as they are banned by the state.169 Past legal regimes, such as Jim Crow-era states
and localities in the American South, have suppressed the articulation of
membership claims by criminalizing otherwise constitutional speech and
conduct.170 The inherent, relatively unchecked capaciousness of immigration law
allows federal executive authority to blur the line between criminal and resister,171
just as sheriffs did in response to civil rights organizing campaigns.172 The
undocumented are discouraged from making affirmative legal claims, and the
state attempts to deport them as expeditiously as possible.173 Intersecting immigration and criminal legal regimes expose immigrants without formal or certain
legal status to various forms of legal violence in homes, workplaces, and
schools.174 Being placed outside of the polity pushes many undocumented
Americans to live in fear or with a sense of stigma.175

169. See Leisy J. Abrego, Legal Consciousness of Undocumented Latinos: Fear and Stigma as Barriers to

Claims-Making for First- and 1.5-Generation Immigrants, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 337, 364 (2011).

170. See Steven E. Barkan, Legal Control of the Southern Civil Rights Movement, 49 AM. SOC. REV. 552,

171.

172.
173.

174.
175.

554 (1984) (“The entire legal machinery of the South became a tool for social control of civil rights
protest.”); cf. WARD CHURCHILL & JIM VANDER WALL, AGENTS OF REPRESSION: THE
FBI’S SECRET WARS AGAINST THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN
MOVEMENT 37–62 (2d ed. 2002) (describing the FBI’s practice of constantly arresting activist
leaders to “simply harass, increase paranoia, tie up activists in a series of [criminal defense
proceedings], and deplete their resources” while also fabricating or withholding evidence).
See supra notes 19 & 77 and accompanying text. Richard Brisbin distinguishes resistance to legality
from criminality by defining the latter as conduct motivated by an individual’s desire for material
goods or attention. Brisbin, supra note 156, at 27. The resister, on the other hand, “desires to
become included in the community governed by law or other norms.” Id. This distinction is nearly
meaningless in contexts in which individuals are disproportionately and inaccurately subject to
policing and criminalization. See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 43 (2009) (arguing that the level of policing within a certain community is a function
of racial segregation).
Barkan, supra note 170, at 556–59, 560–62.
See Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of Immigration Court, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 220–
31 (2017) (describing the increasing use by the federal government in the latter years of the Obama
Administration of mechanisms by which to remove immigrants with even less legal process than
available in overwhelmed immigration courts).
See Cecilia Menjívar & Leisy Abrego, Legal Violence: Immigration Law and the Lives of Central
American Immigrants, 117 AM. J. SOC. 1380, 1388–91 (2012) (documenting the effects of
immigration law in the life experiences of undocumented Central Americans in the United States).
See Abrego, supra note 169, at 354 (“When fear and stigma centrally inform the legal consciousness
of undocumented immigrants, both sentiments can stand as barriers to claim-making.”); id. at 362–
63 (describing differing life experiences and asymmetric rights claiming by segments of the
undocumented population in the United States).
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Against this backdrop, undocumented activists “claim their rights within
and against the law.”176 In the immigration field, there was a clear “endogenous
shift and consciousness change,”177 whereby undocumented activists took control
of both the message and the means of their own advocacy, for themselves, their
families, and their communities. The “exogenous shock” that likely spurred that
shift178 was the near-simultaneity of the enactment of SB 1070 in Arizona, the
collective exhaustion of patience for CIR, and the expansion of S-Comm. In this
period, undocumented activists collectively bared their illegality and began to
perform their “contentious citizenship.”179 A period of contestation within the
immigrant advocacy sector followed, during which there was uncertainty and
mobilization by both incumbents and challengers for strategic control of the
movement.180
Undocumented activists came to resist legality through public expression,
collectivity, and solidarity. Individual stories about injustice and exclusion
became movement stories that mobilized participation.181 The network of
organizations which they joined or formed collaborated with movement lawyers
to reconstruct legality. Movement organizations sought to challenge the policy
presumptions of incumbent actors in both government and the advocacy sector.
They worked with lawyers to support policy prescriptions, such as categorical discretionary relief from the threat of deportation, which earlier had been deemed
unworkable. They fought S-Comm by matching community narratives with data
generated through open records litigation; this methodology led to media
advocacy and local jurisdictional opt-out campaigns. They began to reconstruct
legality and did so by changing law on the books, challenging enforcement practices at the local level, and forcing the exercise of categorical discretion at the federal
level.
In contrast to the absent lawyers in the Ewick and Sibley narratives or the
coopted legal services attorneys in the Sarat story, organizers and activists in
the youth-led movement—who themselves were exercising their agency within
the immigrant advocacy sector—collaborated with lawyers to create a space for
176. Helge Schwiertz, Transformations of the Undocumented Youth Movement and Radical Egalitarian

Citizenship, 20 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 610, 624 (2016).

177. Edelman et al., supra note 152, at 674.
178. Id.
179. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (explaining the use of the term “contentious

citizenship”).
180. See Edelman et al., supra note 152, at 671 (setting forth the features for social movement

organizations of episodes of contention within a movement).
181. See Ewick & Silbey, Narrating, supra note 5, at 1363–65 (arguing that individual stories may not

cause social change but are part of a sociocultural stream that begin to uncover social structures of
injustice).
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themselves within the polity, as protected from federal detention and deportation
and as fully engaged participants in local and state politics. This process suggests
an alternative understanding of resistance to legality with a multi-faceted role for
movement lawyers in the existential reconstruction efforts undertaken by undocumented activists. It also suggests a collective and solidaristic approach to resistance not fully contemplated in this part of the sociolegal literature.182 The
mutually constitutive relationship built by lawyers and activists in the course of
resistance and reconstruction is the core generator of the relational features
outlined in the next Part.
III.

MOVEMENT LAWYERING

As set out in the preceding Part, lawyers have an essential role in the process
of resistance to legality and the subsequent reconstruction of law and social
discourse. Within public interest law, between the impact litigator and the lawyer
turned community organizer, there lies a middle field in which movement
lawyers both deploy conventional legal tools and mechanisms while nurturing
critical visions by which to alter law and social discourse. They do this work by
the means described below.
Jennifer Gordon describes the lawyers who came to work at the United
Farm Workers under General Counsel Jerry Cohen, as relatively free of attachments to law and rules as they were, as well as of conventional institutional
constraints and, thus, able to “figure out ways of generating the kind of power
that’s needed.”183 Lawyers who worked on the campaigns against S-Comm and
for DACA appear to have enjoyed a similar freedom to innovate due to their
institutional homes and their transformative relationships with movement activists. They brought both their own formative experiences and a willingness to
experiment with regard to the form and substance of their work. They made a
role for themselves that was most certainly constituted by the systems in which
they had been educated and had worked up to that point, but also opened
themselves to rich relationships with organizers and activists and allowed the
182. Guinier and Torres note that “[s]ociologists, political scientists, and historians have long studied

social movements, yet their theories of social change also separate the role of law and lawyers, as if
lawyers and social movements function on parallel but distinctive tracks.” Lani Guinier & Gerald
Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a Demoprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 YALE
L.J. 2740, 2802 (2014). The critical legal academic scholarship on public interest lawyering better
capture: (1) the dialogic relationships between law, lawyers, and social movements; and (2) the
mechanics of how those relationships actually works.
183. Jennifer Gordon, Law, Lawyers, and Labor: The United Farm Workers’ Legal Strategy in the 1960s
and 1970s and the Role of Law in Union Organizing Today, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 48 (2005)
(quoting United Federal Workers General Counsel Jerry Cohen).
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political moment to challenge their assumptions and ideas. As Gordon says
about the United Farm Workers lawyers: “The convergence of the times and the
legal context created a set of opportunities that others had not recognized.”184
This Part spotlights key features of the work of these contemporary movement
lawyers, who worked collaboratively with activists to advance a network of affiliated
social movement organizations and to alter the public discourse on immigration
enforcement.
In the 2009–2012 mobilization, two threads of lawyering documented
within the historical civil rights literature185 were evident: (1) establishment lawyers
(and their corresponding organizational clients) operating within a superstructure
set by preexisting distributions of political power using more moderate discursive
framing; and (2) a recessive strand of the legal profession that sought to challenge
the superstructure through the support of activist capacity building and the use of
more critical discursive frames.186 It becomes clear in both historical and
contemporary accounts that the divide between establishment lawyers and
recessive-strand lawyers is not tactical. That is, lawyers in both threads used a
full repertoire of lawyering tactics that included litigation and non-litigation advocacy.187 Though the lawyers may bring different degrees of emphasis to legal
mobilization tools, all of them have an expansive understanding of the legal levers
that can be pulled to achieve social change and are among the most effective in
their fields.
This Part delineates distinctive features of movement lawyering in the fight
for immigrant rights, to suggest a set of understandings shared by the movement
lawyers described in this Article and to extend the critical legal academic literature
on public interest lawyering. Lawyers helped develop critical ideas and organizational infrastructure, generated resources for organizing, and accompanied
movement leaders and constituents. Though my focus in this Article—with the
aim of filling a gap in the literature—is on what lawyers did and how that helped
advance successive campaigns for social change, the features described below are
184. Id. at 50.
185. See, e.g., BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 11, at 175–211 (describing tensions between the approaches

of the NAACP and NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund-affiliated lawyers versus that of
the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), Congress of Racial Equality, the
Committee on Appeal of Human Rights, and lawyers affiliated with the National Lawyers Guild
(NLG)).
186. Id. This split within the legal profession is reflected in the description by Richard Brisbin of how
subjects resist legality, some with an “inside” strategy that reinforces the legitimacy of the regime
and others with a more confrontational and unsettling “outside” strategy that attempts to challenge
foundational distributions of power. Brisbin, supra note 156, at 30–31.
187. See Scott L. Cummings, Critical Legal Consciousness in Action, 120 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 62, 70–
71 (2007).
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dialogic,188 that is they became manifest or were co-generated in the context of
formal and informal relationships marked by equality and mutuality.
A.

Critical Infrastructure

At bottom, the theory of social change advanced by movement lawyers relies
on the deployment of legal tactics that emphasize the development of grassroots
and activist agency in justice campaigns.189 There were two forms of critical
infrastructure that advanced activist agency in this mobilization narrative: (1)
ideational;190 and (2) organizational. The “exogenous shocks” to immigrant
organizing and the turn from CIR to immigration enforcement necessitated the
development of new critical ideas untethered from the assumptions of established
advocacy organizations.191 The corresponding endogenous shifts within existing
social movement organizations and the formation of new organizations required
material support.192 Movement lawyers had a role in both of these processes.
Both the classic texts from the critical legal academic literature on public interest
lawyering,193 as well as newer iterations, such as the recent work on
“demoprudence” by Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres, extol the authorial and
interpretive work of non-lawyers who are themselves subject to conditions of
injustice and exclusion.194 This insight is essential. Guinier and Torres suggest
that some movement actors are represented by lawyers,195 but they pay less attention to the role of lawyers in facilitating critical ideation by movement actors.
Movement lawyers help build narratives that offer a universe of actors to name,

188. See RICHARD SENNETT, TOGETHER: THE RITUALS, PLEASURES AND POLITICS OF CO-

18–20 (2012) (distinguishing between dialogic and dialectic collaboration, the
former emphasizing presence and listening, the latter marked by competition and closure).
See Betty Hung, Essay—Law and Organizing From the Perspective of Organizers: Finding a Shared
Theory of Social Change, 1 L.A. PUB. INT. L.J. 4, 19–23 (2009) (arguing that successful lawyerorganizer collaborations possess a shared a theory of social change).
My conceptualization of critical ideation is informed by the work of Amna Akbar on how the
Movement for Black Lives challenges and reconceives law. See generally Amna A. Akbar, Law’s
Exposure: The Movement and the Legal Academy, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 352 (2015); Amna A. Akbar,
Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). My
conceptualization also owes a great debt to Robert Cover’s foundational work on “jurisgenesis” in a
“jurispathic” state. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term–Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
See Edelman et al., supra note 152, at 675 (advancing an exogenous shock/endogenous shift
framework for social movement organizations in dynamic contexts).
See id.
See sources cited supra notes 7–9.
Guinier & Torres, supra note 182, at 2781–82.
Id.
OPERATION

189.
190.

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
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blame, and claim against.196 This is significant, so that “resistance becomes not
just action against legality but action against those believed to have caused [resistors’] legal disadvantages.”197
When Arizona politicians and law enforcement authorities started enacting
and enforcing anti-immigrant policies, movement lawyers with NDLON,
MALDEF, and the ACLU of Arizona gravitated toward local activists and
helped to support the organizations that they built with their grassroots collaborators.198 Organizers, activists, and movement constituents—not lawyers—were
the face of the campaign in the media and with funders.199 The critical discursive
framing of restrictionism in Arizona, with an explicit critique of white supremacist
law enforcement, came to the fore in media accounts. Movement actors and
lawyers had critical exchanges in defining and framing what was occurring on the
ground in Arizona and sought to bring that understanding into the broader public
consciousness through protest and media advocacy. Lawyers helped support the
construction of new immigrant advocacy organizations at the grassroots and
advanced activist framing of what was happening nationally with elected officials,
allies, funders, and journalists.
As youth activists grew uncomfortable with both the DREAMer narrative
and the continued support of established advocacy organizations for CIR legislation that would intensify immigration enforcement, movement lawyers helped
reinforce critical and solidaristic narratives.200 Day laborers were “the most precarious and stigmatized of the undocumented population.”201 The commitment
of the lawyers at NDLON, MALDEF, and the UCLA Labor Center to this
group202 led them to share the activists’ critique of DREAMer exceptionalism
and to develop solidaristic commitments in their advocacy; these lawyers

196. See William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming,

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Claiming . . ., 15 L. & SOC’Y REV. 631, 635–37 (1980–81) (setting out a framework in which
individual actions to generate disputes define law); Deborah Stone, Causal Stories and the Formation
of Policy Agendas, 104 POL. SCI. Q. 281, 289–93 (suggesting that the advancement of causal stories
yields particular policy solutions).
Brisbin, supra note 156, at 29.
Telephone Interview with Chris Newman, supra note 58; E-mail from Annie Lai, supra note 66. I
discuss this choice further in Section III.C.
Telephone Interview with Chris Newman, supra note 58.
See supra Section I.C.
Walter Nicholls, Politicizing Undocumented Immigrants One Corner at a Time: How Day Laborers
Became a Politically Contentious Group, 40 INT’L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 299, 299, 305 (2016).
Nicholls et al., supra note 127 at 1040–41. Victor Narro, formerly the Workers’ Rights Project
Director at CHIRLA, helped found NDLON and joined the staff of the UCLA Labor Center.
Victor H. Narro, UCLA SCH. L., https://law.ucla.edu/faculty/faculty-profiles/victor-h-narro
[https://perma.cc/S7DY-VDU6].
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understood why it was important to stand with immigrants who were most vulnerable to criminal and immigration enforcement.
As S-Comm spread in jurisdictions across the country, activists began to call
out the Obama Administration, while established advocacy organizations
remained focused on collaborations with the White House to move CIR in
Congress.203 Movement lawyers sought to originate legal and political tactics
against the use of local law enforcement agencies to enforce immigration law,
informed and animated by the day laborer battles of the preceding decades, as
well as the twin threat posed to immigrants in Arizona by SB 1070 and Sheriff
Joe Arpaio.204 Movement actors with roots in local communities understood that
they could not hold in abeyance opposition to Obama-era immigration enforcement on the frayed thread of a hope that CIR would be revived and passed.205
Building on the solidaristic narrative described above, activists and lawyers chose
not to run away from immigrants in the gun sights of ICE and instead found
ways to criticize and slow the implementation of S-Comm.206 This was a consequence both of critical ideation and common organizational relationships being
built between activists and lawyers in Arizona and elsewhere.
Finally, when the stand-alone DREAM Act failed in Congress in late
2010, activists like Neidi Dominguez began to focus on the possibility of an executive exercise of categorical discretion.207 Some were opposed because of the
effect on any remaining chance of moving CIR, while others thought that
the idea was legally deficient or insufficiently protective.208 Lawyers provided
support for movement leaders to make the case for categorical executive discretion
in negotiations with the White House. Once again, movement actors participated
in a mutually reinforcing process of critical ideation. Together, they “ultimately
restructured the politics of the possible” and worked to persuade policymakers
outside of the movement.209 Lawyers provided sources of authority, such as precedents from immigration legal history, for the critical ideas being advanced by
activists in a context of skepticism, if not outright hostility.
Movement actors in each of these instances collaborated to advance initiatives that were outside of the ideational repertoire in the issue area generally in
society, but perhaps more importantly, outside of the ideational repertoire of
established advocacy organizations and allied policymakers in the field. For
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

See supra Sections I.B.–I.D.
See supra Sections I.B.–I.D.
See supra Section I.B.
See supra Section I.C.
See supra Section I.D.
See supra Section I.D.
Guinier & Torres, supra note 182, at 2797, 2798–99.
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dissenters to move ideas from the margins to the center, they needed to access
sources of authority found in law, as well as material organizational resources to
which lawyers have more direct access. Further, in each of the instances noted
above, movement actors advanced ideas that they hoped would shift culture and
not just rules on the books.210 In taking on both policy opponents and putative
allies, movement actors challenged how advocacy incumbents constrained the
bounds of political possibility and suppressed the power of new entrants.211 In
the course of this wave of challenges to advocacy incumbents, they were nourished by and helped build community institutions.212
B.

Resource Generation

Lawyers in social justice struggles are expected to bring litigation to the table
as a key resource.213 The 2009–2012 mobilization is especially interesting for two
reasons. First, there were already leading legal organizations—ACLU-IRP and
NILC—litigating in Arizona against Arpaio and SB 1070 with a long track record
of effective advocacy and deeper pockets than the more movement-centered legal
and organizing groups on the ground.214 Second, immigration law was and is not
especially conducive to litigation campaigns due to the plenary power doctrine215
and the provisions of the 1996 Immigration & Nationality Act amendments that
strip judges of discretion, move cases from the agency directly to federal appellate

210. See Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to Make Social Change, 72
211.
212.
213.

214.
215.

N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 978 (1997) (“‘Culture-shifting’ laws, by contrast, alter basic principles, and
alter them in ways that are inescapable—indeed, transformational. They remake culture.”).
Building on Thomas Stoddard’s observation: “How a new rule comes about [and the standpoint of
those who advance that rule] may be as important as what it says.” Id. at 991.
Francesca Polletta, “Free Spaces” in Collective Action, THEORY & SOC’Y, Feb. 1999, at 1, 4
(“Counterhegemonic frames come not from a disembodied oppositional consciousness or pipeline
to an extra-systemic emancipatory truth, but from longstanding community institutions.”).
Brisbin noted: “The incentive to engage in collective litigation as an act of resistance lies in its
relatively low cost and its ability to provide judgments that change the law or convey a message
about the legal identity and rights of disadvantaged groups.” Brisbin, supra note 156, at 33; see also
E. Tammy Kim, Lawyers as Resource Allies in Workers’ Struggles for Social Change, 13 N.Y. CITY L.
REV. 213, 215–17 (2009) (discussing how lawyers develop litigation that can be nested in multipronged campaigns for social change).
See supra Section I.B.
See Adam Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 373, 378–81
(2004) (describing the plenary power doctrine’s limits on constitutional challenges to wide-ranging
immigration policy); see also LEILA KAWAR, CONTESTING IMMIGRATION POLICY IN COURT:
LEGAL ACTIVISM AND ITS RADIATING EFFECTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE 164
(2015) (arguing that “there is no red herring of assertive constitutional review in immigration
matters,” and that lawyers and activists have to “look[] beyond compliance with official case
dispositions”).
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courts, and prohibit class actions.216 It is possible to raise constitutional concerns
in affirmative class action cases, but the space for institutional reform litigation is
narrow relative to other areas of the law.
Even if one could effectively litigate systemic immigration legal issues, public
interest lawyers would still face longstanding critiques of the use of litigation as a
core social change tactic.217 The critiques are variations on the argument that litigation demobilizes otherwise activated constituents:
[L]itigators too often use state power in service of a principle rather
than using principle in service of resistance to state power or other
concentrations of power that undermine democracy. Causes are
adjudicated into grievances; constituencies of accountability are
demobilized.218

Nevertheless, when the Obama Administration continued the roll-out of SComm, immigrant rights activists and lawyers felt thwarted. There was no obvious
legal theory with which to mount a frontal attack due to the interstitial nature of
the program. S-Comm was not a legislative enactment requiring hearings and
votes or even an agency regulation necessitating a rulemaking process. Instead, it
consisted of incremental adjustments to the ways in which frontline immigration
bureaucrats and professionals worked with other actors in law enforcement.219
Because a direct attack on S-Comm was difficult, alternative strategies
were necessary. Working with CCR and the Cardozo clinic, NDLON hit on a
creative litigation strategy that generated a rich trove of organizing resources: the

216. Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial Review of Immigration

Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1411, 1443–65 (1997) (setting out jurisdictional limits).

217. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM.

HIST. 81, 82–83 (1994) (arguing that backlash to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), set back the civil rights movement); see also, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 338–39 (1991) (contending
that courts do not effect social change); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS:
LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 91, 214 (2d ed. Univ. of Mich. Press
2004) (1974) (positing that the pursuit of rights-based remedies individualizes social problems and
legitimates the political system).
218. Guinier & Torres, supra note 182, at 2756 n.49.
219. Inés Valdez et al., Missing in Action: Practice, Paralegality, and the Nature of Immigration
Enforcement, 21 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 547, 560 (2017). As Inés Valdez, Mat Coleman, and Amna
Akbar note:
The way that § 287(g) and Secure Communities emerged as constitutive elements
of the contemporary U.S. immigration enforcement regime has very little to do with
formal lawmaking and court decision-making, and a lot to do with incremental
adjustments and re-framing on the terrain of frontline immigration bureaucrats and
professionals, which result from contentious encounters between differently located
actors including the courts, DHS leadership, ICE rank-and-file, and civil society actors.
Id.
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National Day Laborers Organizing Network v. United States Immigration and Customs Enforcment Agency220 FOIA case. The litigation provided potent resources
to advance local organizing—data about arrest and deportations stemming from
the program, information about the implementation of S-Comm, and state and
local responses—tied together by a strong national critique of immigration
enforcement as practiced on the ground.221 These resources strengthened organizing at the grassroots level and aimed local interventions “directly at the level of
enforcement.” N. ^#
222
The litigation also exposed the diffuseness of the interior immigration
enforcement strategy and its inaccurate targeting of community members, refuting the central premise of the program that it made communities safer.
NDLON served as lead plaintiff in the FOIA litigation. The CCR and Cardozo
clinic lawyers were not interacting with community leaders and youth activists as
they achieved a succession of victories in federal court.223 NDLON was the conduit by which critical understanding came to shape a legal case that ultimately
was handled by what one participant on the team called “mercenary lawyers.”224
Movement lawyering in this case drew opportunistically on available legal resources. In addition, the relative instability of the field of immigration advocacy
in this period and the legislative paralysis in Washington, D.C. opened space for
movement-centered organizations to focus on ground-level enforcement in public advocacy.225
While the campaign against S-Comm came to be relatively decentralized,
with opt-out campaigns occurring in sub-federal jurisdictions in which there was
immigrant political power that could be developed and harnessed by organizers,
NDLON remained an organizational center of opposition to the program. It
brought inconsistencies between administration rhetoric and the operations and
effects of the program to the attention of elected officials in Congress, who could
demand internal audits and a degree of accountability to the public. NDLON’s
work against the deputation of local law enforcement also led it to become a leading
force with youth activist groups for the passage of the TRUST Act in the
220. 811 F. Supp. 2d 713 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
221. See Francesca Polletta, The Structural Context of Novel Rights Claims: Southern Civil Rights

222.
223.
224.
225.

Organizing, 1961–1966, 34 L. & SOC’Y REV. 367, 402 (2000) (“In this movement [referring to
SNCC], as in others, it was the syncretism of local protest traditions and such ‘master frames’ as
rights that proved so potent.” (citations omitted)).
Valdez et al., supra note 219, at 562.
Telephone Interview with Peter Markowitz, supra note 82.
Id.
See Edelman et al., supra note 152, at 672 (“When field rules are uncertain, actors tend to be more
receptive to new perspectives and to engage in search processes to identify alternatives. Proximate
fields are a readily available and a trusted source for new ideas and practices.”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3079764

Movement Lawyers

1503

California state legislature in 2012 (when it was vetoed by Governor Jerry
Brown) and 2013 (when it was successfully enacted). The TRUST Act and AB
60, which provided driver’s licenses to undocumented residents,226 were legislative campaigns around which movement groups could organize, particularly in
light of legislative paralysis at the federal level.227 Groups participated in media
campaigns, visited legislative offices, and assisted with implementation and
community education after both measures were signed by the governor in 2013.
Lawyers made significant contributions in this period and co-generated
organizing resources with movement leaders and activists. These resources were
on a register between the realm of critical ideation and that of material organizational assets that could be used to strengthen fledgling activist formations. The
resources were legal-conceptual and translated into a federal court complaint and
bill drafts for legislative allies. The lawyers at NDLON, MALDEF, and the
UCLA Labor Center were engaged in ongoing discussions with immigrant
organizers and activists. They understood the enforcement challenges facing
immigrant communities and were looking for opportunities to turn state power
against federal immigration enforcement.228 They found a few such opportunities in these years and shared what they uncovered with their movement partners.
C.

Accompaniment and Transformation

During a period of escalating immigration enforcement and of strategic and
organizational instability in the immigrant rights advocacy sector, movement
lawyers accompanied leaders, activists, and constituents, as they “came out” into
the public sphere and asserted their agency.229 At their best, movement lawyers

226. Assemb. B. 60, 2013–14 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) (codified at CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 1653.5,

12800, 12801–12801.11 (West 2015 & Supp. 2017)).
227. Sameer M. Ashar et al., Navigating Liminal Legalities Along Pathways to Citizenship: Immigrant

Vulnerability and the Role of Mediating Institutions 25–27 (Criminal Justice, Borders and
Citizenship, Research Paper No. 2733860), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2733860.
228. See PENDA D. HAIR, LOUDER THAN WORDS: LAWYERS, COMMUNITIES AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 144 (2001). As Penda Hair explained:
[L]awyers were most effective when they functioned as part of a broader problemsolving process, working to mediate between the role of the law and the goals
of organized and cohesive community members. This is particularly important
when community aspirations are not easily translated with the existing paradigms of
justice. In this role, lawyers continuously ask how the law can be interpreted and
applied to advance community goals.
Id.
229. Cf. Rose Cuison Villazor, The Undocumented Closet, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1, 49–66 (2013) (arguing that
public exposure of undocumented status constitutes an act of resistance).
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“held space” for activists.230 Lawyers make choices about which individuals and
groups to represent or accompany. In a roiling advocacy sector, the lawyers in
this mobilization narrative chose to ally with youth activists, as they asserted
agency and rejected the benevolent direction of incumbent policy advocates in the
immigrant rights field. When the situation in Arizona came to a head with the
passage of SB 1070 and the continuing terror spread by Sheriff Joe Arpaio,
movement lawyers recommitted to supporting new immigrant community
formations such as Puente. When RIFA began to break apart in the middle
Obama years, movement lawyers built common cause with movement activists
around anti-enforcement messaging, local opt-outs from S-Comm, and categorical discretion proposals. And when activists met with White House staffers in
2012 before the announcement of DACA, they were accompanied by their
movement lawyers. Lawyers chose activists and activists chose lawyers in these
instances, under difficult circumstances when former allies were pitted against
one another.231 This accompaniment in the midst of conflict laid the foundation
for a series of successful collaborations between lawyers and movement actors.
As demonstrated in NDLON v. ICE, accountability to relatively powerless
clients does not necessitate a particular kind of thick lawyer-client relationship;
rather, it requires an internalized commitment on the part of lawyers to accept
clients’ methods and goals and a corresponding trust and openness on the part of
activists toward their lawyer-collaborators. NDLON had established a commitment to youth activists through its narrative and material support of their work,
as well as the physical presence of staff lawyers and organizers on the ground in
Arizona. In the open records case, as both plaintiff and, informally, co-counsel, it
was a critical conduit ensuring accountability of the legal team to movement actors.
Lawyers were present as conditions changed rapidly and were close observers
of the fast-developing agency of undocumented youth. Everyday resisters, in the

230. As Chaumtoli Huq explains:

I come back to the idea of being present for each other, holding space for individuals
and communities that need that at this moment in my own effort to make sense of
the present socio-political realities. For me, this practice of listening, and holding
space, allows for compassion and empathy that will be essential for any social justice
path.
Chaumtoli Huq, Calling All Movement Lawyers: We Need to Organize Our Legal Support, L.
MARGINS (Nov. 10, 2016), http://lawatthemargins.com/calling-movement-lawyers-needorganize-legal-support [https://perma.cc/8MAA-L4M5]; see also Bernard Loomer, Two
Conceptions of Power, 6 PROCESS STUD. 5, 24 (1976) (“Presence means that both knowing and
being known are functions of the creativity of both the speaking and the listening.”).
231. See BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 11, at 175–87 (describing the eventual SNCC-NLG alliance in
spite of a long campaign of red-baiting against the Guild).
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narratives of Ewick and Sibley232 and Lucie White233 challenge legal forms and
legal scripts and are themselves changed in some way; in this period, lawyers were
moved by their work with resisters.234 The foundational commitment of youth
activists to a critique of criminalization and mass incarceration—across categories
of immigration status and race—shaped strategy decisions with regard to CIR
and S-Comm and broadened the focus of movement organizations.235 Lawyers
help diffuse dissenting ideas and strategies through networks to multiple organizations, including incumbent policy advocates.236 The commitment of activists
to intersectional identities, as demonstrated by the vibrant presence of LGBT
immigrants in movement leadership, bound constituencies and taught lawyers to
refrain from submerging or obscuring issues and experiences that departed from a
singular narrative manufactured for the consumption of conservative Americans.
Finally, to the extent that lawyers facilitated activists’ resistance and reconstruction of law, they also participated in a consolidation of identity. Ian HaneyLópez writes about the development of Chicano identity in Los Angeles following
the prosecution of movement activists and Oscar Acosta’s defense of those
activists.237 Acosta put the white establishment on trial in his defense cases.238
Lawyers have a role in identity consolidation, in the way that they construct
harms and causalities in advocacy. In this narrative, activism fueled the creative
construction of complex, intersectional identities and the need for a greater degree
of critical consciousness about identity development and community solidarity in
legal advocacy. It is incumbent on lawyers to be aware of that feature of movement work and to assure that legal advocacy leaves space for such creative

232. See, e.g., Ewick & Silbey, Conformity, supra note 5; Ewick & Silbey, Narrating, supra note 5.
233. See, e.g., White supra note 8.
234. See Corey S. Shdaimah, Lawyers and the Power of Community: The Story of South Ardmore, 42 J.

235.
236.

237.
238.

MARSHALL L. REV. 595, 626 (2009) (“We should not underestimate what community groups can
do for lawyers. Lawyers who envision their work as part of some greater good derive sustenance
and inspiration from their work with community organizations or social movements, even dormant
or nascent ones.”).
See Edelman et al., supra note 152, at 660 (“[S]ocial movement ideals permeate organizations
indirectly by altering organizations’ institutional environments.”).
Id. at 673. As Edelman et al. noted:
Diffusion occurs largely through the work of field actors, especially those who
work across the boundaries of fields, such as . . . lawyers who work within or advise
social movements. These actors may play central roles in helping shifts in meaning
within one field seep into other fields. When consciousness begins to shift,
professional networks become a primary means by which new ideas spread both
within and across field boundaries.
Id.
IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, RACISM ON TRIAL: THE CHICANO FIGHT FOR JUSTICE 205–29
(2003).
Id. at 45–55.
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construction, rather than squeezing people into the pre-existing categories that
are intuitive to those in power.
CONCLUSION
“At the end of the day we have no choice but to fight.”239
In this first year of the Trump Administration, anti-immigrant animus
drives a successful campaign intended to evoke fear in communities.240 Sheriff
Joe Arpaio has been pardoned after his conviction for noncompliance with federal
court orders prohibiting racial profiling.241 The Trump Administration has terminated DACA.242 Movement actors understood that white supremacy underlay
Arpaio’s regime of racial profiling and systematic dehumanization in Arizona.
White supremacy now drives federal immigration enforcement, without shame
or constraint.243 The trajectory of the immigrant rights movement after 2012 will
239. Jennifer Medina, A Defender of the Constitution, With No Legal Right to Live Here, N.Y. TIMES (July
240.
241.
242.
243.

17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/17/us/undocumented-immigrants-illegal-citizen
ship.html (quoting immigration lawyer Lizbeth Mateo).
Adam Goodman, The Core of Donald Trump’s Immigration Policy? Fear., WASH. POST (Aug. 24,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2017/08/24/the-core-of-don
ald-trumps-immigration-policy-fear/?utm_term=.ca4713063287 [https://perma.cc/3DNY-XGAS].
Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Maggie Haberman, Trump Pardons Joe Arpaio, Who Became Face of
Crackdown on Illegal Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/08/25/us/politics/joe-arpaio-trump-pardon-sheriff-arizona.html.
Michael D. Shear & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Moves to End DACA and Calls on Congress to
Act, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/05/us/politics/trump-dacadreamers-immigration.html.
See Cristina Jiménez, Fighting for Our Lives: Immigrants Rising Up Against White Supremacy,
MEDIUM (Aug. 24, 2017), https://medium.com/@UNITEDWEDREAM/fighting-for-ourlives-immigrants-rising-up-against-white-supremacy-820f8887e5d7 [https://perma.cc/8G4DJLK2]. Jiménez notes:
The push to enact the Muslim ban, the effort to win Congressional
funding for the border wall, the building of more detention camps, the
laughing about police brutality, the hiring of more ICE agents to go to schools,
churches, and homes to round up immigrant youth and families for detention
and deportation: all of this is white supremacy in action.
Id.; see also Who’s Behind the Plot Against DACA, CTR. NEW COMMUNITY, https://
www.plotagainstdaca.com/ [https://perma.cc/QD8L-DFVA]. The Center for New Community
stated:
Anti-immigrant organizations like FAIR, CIS, NumbersUSA, and IRLI,
all of which have ties to white nationalists, have long taken a hardline stance that
the federal government should dramatically restrict immigration and make life
as difficult as possible for undocumented immigrants already living
here. . . . They are also at the center of the latest assaults on young immigrants.
Id.; cf. SASHA POLAKOW-SURANSKY, GO BACK TO WHERE YOU CAME FROM: THE
BACKLASH AGAINST IMMIGRATION AND THE FATE OF WESTERN DEMOCRACY 280–83
(2017). Sasha Polakow-Suransky explains:
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be the subject of future scholarship. However, the positive portrayal of movement
actors and allied lawyers in this Article raises the question of how their assertion
of agency and development of critical infrastructure gave way to an ascendant
white supremacist immigration restrictionism.
It would be a mistake to truncate immigration legal history into a four- or
six-year period, when we know that cycles of nativism and the resort to forms of
white supremacy in immigration policy have been with us from the time that the
first settler-colonialists took the land from Indigenous Peoples and forced Africans
into slavery to work that land. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the
immigration legal system was in a state of paralysis with a large population of
undocumented people vulnerable to state violence, intensified after 9/11. The
legislative strategy pursued by liberal and moderate politicians for a decade had
not worked. Instead, youth activists pushed for more contingent but also more
immediate remedies as they rose in the immigrant rights advocacy field. They
did so with the essential assistance of movement lawyers.
As we confront the dire need for resistance and reconstruction, this Article
is an offering: an examination of how the collaborations between movement actors
and lawyers worked in a brief period of ascension. This Article describes the role
of lawyers in a process of resistance to legality and the collaborative reconstruction
of law and social discourse and it aims to inform and enrich movement lawyering
over the long arc of struggle and liberation.

The mainstreaming of xenophobic views and policies could eventually undermine the liberal
democratic model of government in countries that we today regard as progressive and tolerant.
The result would be a watered-down form of democracy that deprives immigrants and ethnic
and religious minorities of basic rights. And, at worst, it would mean a resurgence of the ugliest
national ideologies that marred the history of the twentieth century.
Id. at 292.
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